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The Interface of Myth and
Practice in Law
Stanley Ingber* t
Many who have an idea of their possibilities and needs nevertheless
accept the prevailing order in the way they act, and thereby strengthen
and confirm it absolutely.1
-opening English title of film Effi Briest
Ah, but a man's reach should
exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?'
-Robert Browning
Few professors of beginning law students are unfamiliar with
the frustration engendered when, following a classroom exploration
of a multifaceted legal issue, a student poses the question: "So
what is the answer-what is the law?" No matter how comprehen-
sive the discussion of the issue may have been, the student remains
unsatisfied because he has come seeking the holy grail-knowledge
grounded in truth and certainty, or the syllogism that discovers
such knowledge."
The student is articulating a common perception of law as a
set of rules. This view perceives the legal process as achieving con-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida, Holland Law Center. B.A., 1969, Brooklyn
College; J.D., 1972, Yale University.
t Four friends, scholars, and teachers have had an obvious impact upon me and, conse-
quently, upon this Article. My thanks and appreciation go to Professors Jan Deutsch, Myers
McDougal, W. Michael Reisman, and Walter Weyrauch.
1. Film, EFFI BRmSr (based on novel by Theodore Fontane) opening English title (R.
Fasbinder dir. 1974).
2. Browning, Andrea del Sarto (1855), reprinted in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF PO-
ErRY 796 (rev. ed. 1975).
3. Prosser, in his classic article Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 257 (1948),
beautifully portrays the frustration of teaching and learning the law in his story of a West
Coast Indian sitting on a rock, looking out to sea and saying, "Lighthouse, him no good for
fog. Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow, him ring bell, him flash light, him raise hell; but fog
come in just the same." Id.
4. Jerome Frank has suggested that this desire to achieve certainty reflects an uncon-
scious wish to find a substitute for the firmness, certainty, and infallibility ascribed in child-
hood to the parent. J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 14-23 (1963). This demand for
certainty in law is compared to a similar demand in religion. See text accompanying notes 8-
10 infra; notes 31 & 80 infra.
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flict resolution by imposing these fixed and preexisting rules upon
disputes. The experiences of legal decisionmakers, when analyzed
critically, however, belie this perspective. Law in fact is enmeshed
in uncertainty and permeated with discretion, yet the myth of law
as the application of fixed, logically derived rules survives.
The purpose of this Article is to explore this myth, including
its apparent inaccuracies, and to explain its persistence by recog-
nizing the valid societal function that it fulfills. Part I will focus on
this myth or religion of law-a law of rules-and attempt to ex-
plain its attractiveness to the nascent and practicing legal deci-
sionmaker. Part II will explore the role of the lawyer within a pro-
cess of decisionmaldng that is actually imbued with ambiguity.
Finally, Part III will consider the remaining significance of "the
law" as a very real factor that limits and controls the legal
decisionmaker.
I. THE MYTH AND ITS INACCURACIES
A. The Search for Authority
The unique role that lawyers play in American democracy has
long been recognized.5 Americans are culturally conditioned to
seek and trust lawyers to answer questions, settle disputes, and de-
termine the law in contexts perceived as legal in nature.' The law-
yer is to know what to do; he is to know the answer.7 How is the
lawyer expected to have such knowledge?
1. The Religion of Law
American legal rhetoric portrays this nation as one of law and
not of men. Such a statement depicts law as preexistent to and
untainted by man.8 This view invites the analogy of law to ortho-
5. See A. DE TOCQUEVILE, DEMOCRACY iN AMEmCA 270 (Doubleday's Anchor Books
1969).
6. The contemporary lawyer has been described as a "specialist in advising, making or
appraising social choices or decisions." Reisman, A Theory About Law from the Policy Per-
spective, in LAW AND PoLcY 75 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976). There are, of course, a plethora of
decisionmakers in addition to lawyers that take part in the process of decisionmaking de-
scribed in this Article. Lawyers are an appropriate focus, however, because in our society
they constitute a disproportionate share of the significant actors in the decisional process
that determines the structure of society. Moreover, the training of the lawyer brings him
face-to-face with the myth, its necessity, and its limitations.
7. The doctor, for example, increasingly consults the lawyer to determine how best to
interact with his patients. The lawyer virtually never consults the doctor about his interac-
tion with clients.
8. Aristotle also perceived law as the application of set rules. For him the best law left
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dox, although secular, religion, in which the practitioner assumes
the role of the clergy in learning, discovering, and applying rules
that emanate from some source superior to that of mankind. Deci-
sions of the clergy are deemed authoritative only when those who
are affected believe that the decisions are made simply by the ap-
plication of known rules to a specific situation.9 "Legalism" is the
label given to the view that human conflict can be settled by the
imposition of established rules in a legal proceeding. 0 This percep-
tion requires that the law contain a preexisting solution for every
conceivable case. Consequently, the law is complete, consistent,
and determinate. When the legal process fails to sustain these ex-
pectations, the imperfection is attributed to the applier's inade-
quate power of discernment rather than the fallibility of the law.11
"Legalism," therefore, does not tolerate a recognition of a deci-
sionmaker's ability to "make law" by choosing among plausible
alternatives.'
Another more refined (or reformed) view of law in this reli-
gious motif perceives law not as a preexisting and known set of
rules, but rather as a group of rules that is discoverable through a
syllogistic process of reasoning. s Law is revealed by a process of
inexorable, logical analysis that is neutral, disinterested, and unbi-
ased.14 The rules are either to be value-free-part of a legal system
made watertight against all normative intrusions-or based upon
the least to the discretion of lawyers. H. CAiNs, LEGAL PHMOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL
217 (1949). Other more valid interpretations can be given to the saying found in the text.
See text accompanying notes 131-33 infra. For a discussion of the principle of legality, see
Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28 RUTGERS
L. REv. 861, 927-30 (1975).
9. This belief is illustrated by litigants who consider themselves entitled to have
judges apply some previously existing law to their dispute rather than have "new law"
made. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the No-
ble Dream, 11 GA. L. Rav. 969, 972 (1977).
10. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964). Judith Shklar defines "legalism" as "the ethical at-
titude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to
consist of duties and rights determined by rules." Id.
11. Arguably, as our society increasingly rejects orthodox religions, becoming agnostic
or even atheistic, the secular religion of law is turned to more fervently as one of the few
remaining moral anchors.
12. See Hart, supra note 9, at 983.
13. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 404,
404-05 (J. Hall ed. 1972). This syllogistic process of reasoning is often referred to as "think-
ing like a lawyer." Consequently, only those who are insiders, who think like lawyers, may
see the "rightness" of the legal decision. Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REv. 1201, 1244-
45 (1977).
14. O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 Jun.
8, 17 (1980).
1981]
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some previously existing and accepted value-some Grundnorm.15
In the American legal system, that normative foundation is articu-
lated in terms of the Constitution," the Founding Fathers,17 or
precedent,' among others.1 9
For both "legalism" and the more refined version of law as
rules, authority exists prior to the process of decision. Prescription
and application are separated. The legal clergyman is granted the
right to apply the rules in the process of decision only because he
already knows or can discover the existing commandments of the
law or the disembodied sovereign.20 He who deviates from or ob-
scures the law is scorned, while the law itself continues to be per-
ceived as deserving adulation. Consequently, the lay public re-
sponds ambivalently to the lawyer/clergyman. The lawyer is
respected for his training in and knowledge of the rules. He also,
however, is held in cynical disdain because of "a belief that the
lawyers complicate the law, and complicate it wantonly and unnec-
essarily, [in] that, if the legal profession did not interpose its craft-
iness and guile, the law could be clear, exact and certain."'
2. The Impact of the Myth
From clerical robes to the use of incantations and rituals, the
legal system has taken on many of the trappings of institutional-
ized religion. Like religion, law also
establishes standards of "rationality," channels behavior, and permits predic-
tion of the future. A body of principles is formulated which is of great practi-
cal importance, largely governed by precedents, invoked in an archaic and
cryptic language, and hostile to empirical observation and checks. These
principles establish a system of power relations which can be used for pur-
poses of social control, and toward this end imposition of sanctions is
threatened."
15. See generally H. KELSEN, EssAYs IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1973).
16. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
17. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
18. E.g., In re Boggs-Rice Co., 66 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1933); The Madrid, 40 F. 677
(E.D. La. 1899); State ex rel. La Prade v. Cox, 43 Ariz. 174, 30 P.2d 825 (1934).
19. See text accompanying notes 57-74 infra.
20. Blackstone defines law precisely as the commands of such a "supreme power." 1
W. BLACKSTONE, CoMEmrrARIES *43.
21. *J. FRANK, supra note 4, at 5.
22. Weyrauch, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REv. 782, 798 (1973). While Weyrauch is
comparing law to magic rather than religion, his description of law also fits well into the
[Vol. 34:309
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Lawyers, as beneficiaries of the aura of these religious trappings,
tend to participate in legal rituals and present the law with a
certain flair of righteousness and superior knowledge. A decision-
making elite is formed in which only those legally trained are
deemed capable of understanding or dealing with the complexity
of the decisional process.2 8
Such an elite should be anathematized in a political system
permeated with democratic rhetoric. While the democratic system
ostensibly rejects rule by wealth or artistocracy, it appears to have
accepted rule by lawyers, for their knowledge and skill of "the law"
allows them to be both of and above the masses.2 4 The lawyer elite
has developed a temper, as do all elites, that is conservative and
antidemocratic even though it owes its political power to the popu-
lar acceptance of a democratic, nonelitist government. 5
This potential conflict is avoided because of the pervasive be-
lief in law as rules. The belief serves two functions. First, as in
religion, faith that the preexisting rules emanate from some higher
source obscures the perception of a system based on decisionmak-
ing by an elite.2 6 Thus, the legal decision appears as a product not
of the legal decisionmaker but of "the law,"' 27 thus enhancing the
religious motif.
23. The lawyer protects the elite status by developing a language interpretable only by
others trained in the law. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 18 (1975).
24. Such a status is important for those lawyers who argue for minority rights. As-
sume, for example, a situation in which a majority wants certain behavior outlawed while a
minority wants it to remain legal. The state must choose whether to criminalize, and thus
support the majority, or to refuse to criminalize, giving the minority a veto over majority
will. Supporters of a minority veto must justify their position by stating that the majority is,
in some sense, wrong in its desire to criminalize. The majority, however, does not believe
itself wrong. Consequently, the majority must be doubly wrong-first in wanting to
criminalize the behavior, and second, in thinking it understands the difference between
right and wrong. Minority rights thus depend for their existence upon support of an elite
whose determination of right must rule over the opinion of the masses. Concern over such
an elite is the essence of the rejection by Lord Devlin of the patrician ideology of John
Stuart Mill. See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).
25. A. DE TOcQREvILLE, supra note 5, at 264-65.
26. The sense of stability and certainty attributable to the perception of rules contrib-
utes immeasurably to the public acceptance of law. "Unless there are rules, there will be no
certainty in the [legal] process; they are an assurance that human affairs will follow a gen-
eral pattern and will not be at the mercy of ignorant and improperly influenced officials." H.
CAIRNS, supra note 8, at 219.
27. Dostoevsky's description of institutionalized religion compares interestingly. Upon
the return of Christ during the Spanish Inquisition, the Grand Inquisitor confronts Him:
Canst Thou have simply come to the elect and for the elect? But if so, it is a mystery
and we cannot understand it. And if it is a mystery, we too have a right to preach a
mystery, and to teach them that it's not the free judgment of their hearts, not love that
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decision's acceptability with both parties and critics. A decision-
making system cannot claim to be a system of law if compliance
can be attained only by an exercise of power.2
Second, the perception of law as rules serves to protect the
lawyer's psyche. A decisionmaker who recognizes that his decisions
have significant impact on the lives of others and are, in essence,
his "personal" responsibility may be overwhelmed by his burden.2
Viewing the decision as an outcome mandated by "the law" allows
the decisionmaker to disown his responsibility for its effect.3 0 The
belief in law as rules, thus, both gives authority to the elites to
decide and insulates them from responsibility for the effects of
their decisions.31
This image of law gives great support to the lawyer elite. The
individual who chooses to enter the legal profession may have a
personality structure that needs and seeks certainty, truth, and or-
der.2 His perception of law as rules or as a process of rule discov-
ery promises to fulfill this need. He thus expects legal education to
matters, but a mystery which they must follow blindly, even against their conscience.
So we have done. We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon miracle,
mystery and authority.
F. DOSTOEVSKY, The Grand Inquisitor, in THE BRoTHERS KARA.zov Book V, Chapter V, at
264 (MacMillan & Co. 1948) (emphasis in original).
28. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authori-
tative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDuc. 253, 403 (1967).
29. Kierkegaard noted that nothing is more fearful for man than to realize how much
he is capable of. 1 S. KIERKEGA AR, JouRNA ANn PAPES 440 (H. & E. Hong eds. 1964).
The lawyer's role is that of a decisionmaker, whether he is judge or advocate. The judge
articulates the final outcome of the dispute and is a clearly exposed decisionmaker. His
"decision," however, is often predicated upon the arguments made by the advocates before
him. Since the arguments selected and presented by the advocate often determine the reso-
lution of the conflict, the advocate exists at the center of the decisionmaking process. Even
in those situations that seemingly deal with a "cut-and-dried" question of law, it is the
lawyer who determines the proper response to the statute and acts upon it. Many rules that
appear "clear" have fallen to arguments of unconstitutionality. When the attorney chooses
to follow the law in the "clear" situation, his decision ratifies that law and carries as much
responsibility as when he chooses to attack it. See note 75 infra.
30. Jurors frequently remain uninformed of their power to nullify the law in criminal
prosecutions so that they too may be protected from the burdensome knowledge of their
impact on others. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31. The Grand Inquisitor, speaking of and to the deity-figure of another religion, re-
vealed the same process.
[The masses] will marvel at us and look on us as gods, because we are ready to endure
the freedom which they have found so dreadful and to rule over them-so awful it will
seem to them to be free. But we shall tell them that we are Thy servants and rule them
in Thy name.... That deception will be our suffering, for we shall be forced to lie.
F. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 27, at 260.
32. The portrait of beginning law students described in this Article is a kind of profile
or social character and is not an empirical construct.
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supply rules that will answer the problems he will confront as a
lawyer. This seductiveness of the myth is, of course, not restricted
to law students, but the following reference to their experience il-
lustrates the disillusionment that they perceive when the expecta-
tions stimulated by the myth are violated.
B. Violated Expectations
1. The Limitations of Rules and Precedent
The student's image of law as rules becomes problematic from
the beginning of his training. Rather than the expected certainty,
he finds himself overwhelmed by ambiguity. The conventional un-
derstanding of how rules operate assumes that they exist and that
there is knowledge of them prior to the process of decision. 3
Within this conventional framework, conclusions are formed by a
process of deductive reasoning." In reality, however, "legal" rules
are made during the process of decision. Each new decision rede-
fines and reconsiders the meaning, parameters, and significance of
former decisions.3 5 Rules purportedly derived from precedent are
merely attempted summarizations of past decisions that have tack-
led similar problems. These rules are induced by an examination of
the facts and the results of relevant cases;38 thus, they are
tentative.
Such "summary rules" are open to analysis and criticism on
33. This concept of rules is what Rawls refers to as rules of a practice. Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL RV. 3, 18-19 (1955). Prior command is also Black-
stone's view of law. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *43.
34. Justice Black, in his search for constitutional absolutes, also sought to authorize
legal decisions by use of a deductive process reminiscent of that suggested by Kelsen. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-26 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See also H.
KELSEN, supra note 15.
35. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, in JURISPRUDENCE 961, 964 (G. Christie
ed. 1973). The novelist Robert Penn Warren aptly describes this process through the dia-
logue of the character Willie Stark.
[Law is] like a single-bed blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed and a cold
night. There ain't never enough blanket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling
and hauling, and somebody is always going to nigh catch pneumonia. Hell, the law is
like the pants you bought last year for a growing boy, but it is always this year, and the
seams are popped and the shankbone's to the breeze. The law is always too short and
too tight for growing mankind. The best you can do is do something and then make up
some law to fit...
R. WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MeN 145 (1st ed. 1946).
36. Rule-skeptics insist that the plethora of cases available for review allow the most
contradictory positions to simultaneously claim consistency with the relevant cases. H.
JOLOWrCZ, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 257 (1963); D. WIGDoR, ROSCOE POUND 257 (1974).
19811
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multiple levels. The innumerable environmental factors3 7 that may
have influenced the outcome of the cases from which the "rule"
was derived need to be understood if its scope and significance are
to be evaluated. The relevant questions, however, include not only
what led to this rule, and why this outcome given this rule, but
why this rule, and from whence does it gain its authority? If the
sole answer forthcoming is "precedent," there is only infinite re-
gression rather than an understanding of the process of legal deci-
sionmaking. Consequently,
[e]ach person is in principle always entitled to reconsider the correctness of a
rule and to question whether or not it is proper to follow it in a particular
case. As rules are guides and aids, one may ask whether in past decisions
there might not have been a mistake in applying [general moral] principle[s]
to get the rule in question, and wonder whether or not it is best in this case.3
Therefore, precedents and the "rules" derived therefrom be-
come guides rather than proscriptions. 9 Precedent cannot be un-
derstood as serving as logical axioms that, when mechanically ap-
plied, formulate a "correct" conclusion; rather, precedent is an
accumulation of wisdom against which the validity of new conclu-
sions can be assessed. Thus, a consideration of precedent does not
terminate the decisional process, it merely supplies reference mate-
rial. Many provocative questions remain: was the past wisdom re-
ally ever wise;40 was it wise when made, but changed conditions
have altered its wisdom; even if past wisdom is still wise, is the
present problem different enough to elude the contours of the past
decision?"1
Since most decisions required of the legal system involve reso-
lution of the conflict between arguments for change and those for
37. Environmental factors include considerations of economics, psychology, history,
and the like that might consciously or unconsciously influence decisionmakers.
38. Rawls, supra note 33, at 23.
39. The determination of decisions through the application of precedent, conse-
quently, cannot be understood by the frequently offered metaphor of building blocks
mechanically imposing an inevitable result. Rather, the process is more consistent with that
of the scientific method that consults and evaluates past wisdom prior to taking each new
decisional step. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Inter-
sections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. Rxv. 169, 232 (1968).
40. This perception of rules as displaceable presumptions or working hypotheses, to be
modified or rejected if the predictable consequences of their application in a shifting social
context prove unsatisfactory, was the pragmatic core of legal realism. See Hart, supra note
9, at 976.
41. In every case there must be a decision as to "which of the circumstances of the
alleged precedent [are] relevant to the decision," and "whether the circumstances of [the
case at hand] are in their essentials similar." H. JoLowicz, supra note 36, at 257.
[Vol. 34:309
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stability,42 the effect of precedent must be limited. To remain via-
ble, law must allow for change while guaranteeing a degree of sta-
bility. Consequently, law develops and functions in a constant
state of tension. In such a state, the value of "rules" is sorely
limited.
Summary rules are not "valueless," however, for they lend effi-
ciency to the process of decision. A case is more quickly resolved
by application of rules derived from similar past decisions than by
an entirely new process of decision. Furthermore, if an accepted
rule is used to resolve the legal issue, the decisionmaker need not
constantly repeat the wrenching process of decision and, conse-
quently, can conserve his emotional and intellectual energy. Thus,
"rules" allow resources to be directed into more productive realms.
Precedential rules also serve as guides and reminders to intellectu-
ally and morally fallible decisionmakers, therefore reducing the
likelihood of the waste of resources that occurs when an inferior
decision is made."
Rules may also serve to promote social order. They accomplish
this goal by creating expectations about the legal significance of
one's behavior. Without moderately secure expectations, an indi-
vidual could not structure his actions in a manner most likely to
effectuate his desires to contract, alienate property, or the like."
Without some certainty, all behavior would present the risk of liti-
gation and sanction. It follows, then, that any deviation from pre-
42. While the process being discussed is most clearly descriptive of the common-law
and constitutional processes of decisionmaking, it is also pertinent to law created by legisla-
tion and administrative rulemaking. Legislation and rulemaking are also decisional
processes that attempt to resolve value conflicts, which in their cases are predicted future
conflicts. Thus, they should be subject to the same thorough critique as all other decision-
making. The forum for effectuating such criticism likely is the legislature or administrative
proceedings rather than the courtroom. Furthermore, since the language of the rule or stat-
ute must be broad enough to cover a category of potential conflicts, the determination of the
parameters of its coverage is an incremental interpretive process closely analogous to com-
mon-law development.
43. Professor Lawrence Alexander has suggested that while correct moral principles
are those that would be applied by an omniscient decisionmaker, in the hands of fallible
humans such tools may be less likely to produce desirable outcomes than are more mechani-
cal rules that are easier to apply and whose application is easier to monitor and predict. L.
Alexander, Modem Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxanomy and Critique
14 (manuscript to be published in 42 Omo ST. L.J. (1981)).
44. The importance of predictability has been amply discussed in American jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., L. FuLLXR, Tns MORAIrrY OF LAw 37 (1969) ("A law that changes every day
is worse than no law at all."); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897) (the effectiveness of law depends upon the "bad man's" prediction of punishment for
wrongdoing).
1981] 317
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cedent precipitates a degree of societal insecurity. Consequently,
the burden of proof must always fall upon the one seeking such
change.45
System efficiency and social order, however, as valuable as
they are, are insufficient justifications for mechanical application
of precedential rules. Efficiency and order are only significant in-
terests when they lead to the fulfillment of valued societal goals or
encourage evolution in such directions.4 e Precedent thus essentially
serves only as a guide worthy of some deference by decisionmakers.
These decisionmakers, however, must still assess when and how far
the guide is to be followed in an effort to accomplish the desired
purpose.4 Law-whether tort, criminal, or contract-is not a tan-
gible item but a decisional process by which goals may be accom-
plished and/or values articulated and supported. Ideology,4e there-
fore, is at the core of all legal decisions.49
45. The burden is greater in those areas of the law in which the wish is to encourage
parties to orient their behavior to conform with "the law." Contract negotiations among
parties, for example, depend on a good deal of stability in the law. In torts, however, the
parties are likely to have had no contact prior to injury, thus reducing the likelihood of any
pre-injury negotiations to allocate risk. The goal of ever reducing accident costs minimizes
the persuasiveness of demands for concrete and clearly designated standards of care.
46. For example, the rule of caveat emptor broke down as society became more solici-
tous of an uninformed consumer class that was unable to protect itself.
47. How, for example, is one to know when a tort has taken place? Traditionally, a
tort has been described as a civil wrong other than breach of contract for which the law
gives a remedy. See, e.g., Coleman v. California Yearly Meeting of Friends Church, 27 Cal.
App. 2d 579, 582, 81 P.2d 469, 470 (1938); Diver v. Miller, 34 Del. 207, 213, 148 A. 291, 293
(1929). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971). This definition, tauto-
logical like all definitions, fails to describe the types of wrongs for which law will give a
remedy. To determine if a tort has taken place, one must first designate what the law should
accomplish and then determine whether a tort designation in the specific case would help to
accomplish such a goal.
48. "Ideology" of a given individual (at a given time) is understood to mean the amal-
gam of criteria by which he determines value, status, and worth. All decisions made by an
individual are determined with reference to those criteria.
49. Some illustrations may be in order.
(1) In the case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), plaintiff was
harmed by a shot from one of two negligent hunters. The court refused to burden plaintiff
with the responsibility of proving which of the two hunters had actually caused the injury,
but allowed him to receive a judgment against both. Apparently the court believed that
plaintiff should be compensated and that neither defendant should benefit from the fact
that the other defendant was also negligent. Yet if a plaintiff in a paternity suit could not
designate which of two defendants had actually fathered her child, would the court allow
successful suits against both men? Although the two cases are scientifically similar, the ideo-
logical impact of formally recognizing multiple fathers as well as the potential of disapproval
for the "promiscuous" plaintiff negate the precedential effect of Summers in this situation.
(2) An individual who wrongly injures another is likely to be held causally responsible
in a civil suit for any further injury, including death, due to medical malpractice associated
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2. The Ideology of Law
A recurring myth of law is neutrality as symbolized by blind-
folded justice. One manifestation of this myth is the repeated
dream that the legal process be nonideological.5 0 The scholarly de-
bate over legal neutrality is a concern of Professor Herbert Wechs-
ler.51 Wechsler insists that legal decisions, especially constitutional
decisions, must be principled. A principled decision, says Wechsler,
"is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the
case, reasons that in their generality and neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. '5 If "neutral criteria" for deci-
sions must be value-free, however, no such criteria exist. Value
preferences inescapably intrude to guide decisions among compet-
ing alternatives." At best, Wechsler must mean neutral applica-
tions of general, although value-laden, criteria."
The requirement of generality cannot be total, for such a de-
mand would require a coherent value system in which principles
never conflicted in flesh and blood cases. A principle is applied
neutrally when it is applied to a sufficiently large number of di-
verse fact situations as to appear to be neither ad hoc nor lacking
in appreciation of contextual differences. The application need be
only "adequately general. ' '55
with the treatment of the initial injury. The same injuror, however, will likely not be held
causally responsible for the death in a criminal proceeding. While the decisionmaker is will-
ing to place the burden of proving malpractice upon the first tortfeasor (who can sue the
malpracticing doctor for indemnification) rather than upon the injured party, he likely will
be reluctant to impose the stigma of a homicide conviction upon the injuror. Yet in any
scientific sense the initial injury is as much the cause of death in one suit as in the other.
Causation thus proves less scientific than ideological and varies from one context and conse-
quence to another.
50. M. SHAPIRo, LAw AND POLrrIcs IN THE SuPREME COURT 26 (1964). This dream can
take one of two forms. Either law itself is seen as ideologically neutral, or the ideology ad-
mitted to exist in the law is seen as being neutrally discovered and applied by the
decisionmaker.
51. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES,
POLMICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3 (1961).
52. Id. at 27-28.
53. Compare Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661 (1960), with Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral
Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 571 (1960).
54. See Deutsch, supra note 39, at 188-90. Justice Black's insistence upon absolutes in
constitutional adjudication, see note 34 supra, is problematic for it demands just such a
totally coherent, nonconflicting value system. If judicial review was only justified when
based on such a system, little review would take place.
55. Deutsch, supra note 39, at 188. Adequate generality is "that degree of generality
perceived as adequate by the very society that imposes the requirement of adequate gener-
ality to begin with .. " Id. at 195. An illustration may add clarity. When Congress passed
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The adequacy of application of a principle is a function of the
degree of generality in its formulation-the degree to which com-
peting values are taken into account in the derivation of the princi-
ple. Thus the content of the principle, its evaluation of competing
values, must also be considered. While a neutrally applied, ade-
quately general principle may be a delight to see, the authority of
the principle itself may still be questioned.
Although law itself may not be value neutral, the ideology of
law still may be authoritative, under the myth of neutrality, if the
ideology may be neutrally discovered. Clear lines thus theoretically
can be drawn between the values of "the law" and the overreach-
ing of a decisionmaker imposing his own value idiosyncracies upon
the legal process.5 6 Sources of ideology frequently noted include
reason and logic, natural law, community consensus, tradition, and
the Constitution. Each "source" is deficient.
(a) Reason and Logic
Like neutral principles, logic and reason do not themselves
justify an ideological position. They cannot supply perspective. At
best they may have little more usefulness for analytical purposes
than to indicate consistency within a given system of belief.57 Once
values are chosen, reason and logic may be effective tools in devel-
oping a process of value fulfillment. s Ultimate choices among val-
ues, however, must precede any process of rationality."'
legislation forbidding discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, and
national origin, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (Supp. HI
1979), cries were heard that the legislation had violated the property rights of employers.
Nonetheless, such legislation has been judicially upheld as a furtherance of equality. United
Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In a totally coherent value
system, such decisions would seem to represent the principle that equality interests are su-
perior to property interests. Yet a statute that required citizens to place all their property in
a common pool to be distributed equally among all would clearly be an unconstitutional
violation of property rights. Obviously, equality interests are not always recognized as supe-
rior to property interests. The principles articulated in the employment discrimination cases
are adequately general, however, if their nonapplication in other situations, such as in the
property distribution case above, can be justified by reference to competing principles.
56. Jurists often voice their rejection of any legal perspective that acknowledges a role
for individual idiosyncracies. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In determining what rights are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.").
57. Weyrauch, supra note 22, at 800.
58. Logic itself is a comparatively recent source of legal discourse. See generally T.
VIEHWEG, TOPIK UND JURISPRUDENZ (5th ed. 1974).
59. Either reason is an empty source for the determination of value or it is camouflage
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(b) Natural Law
The deficiency in using natural law as a value source is the
inability to test its content. Attempts to build an ideology upon
universal law are trapped in a dilemma. Either the alleged univer-
sal ends are too few and abstract to aid in deciding specific con-
flicts, or they are too numerous and concrete to be truly univer-
sal.60 Consequently, the content of natural law consists of whatever
the individual ascribing to it desires to advocate. Supporters of
both the status quo and radical change"' have repeatedly invoked
it to reach opposite results. Essentially, natural law serves as a de-
bater's bludgeon used to support and defend one's own position
while battering those of one's opponents. e2
(c) Community Consensus
In a nation spanning close to five million square miles and in-
cluding over two hundred million people, consensus is hard to find.
Conventional moral culture is likely to vary significantly from
place to place as well as among different groups within the same
community. To ascertain consensus in a nonhomogeneous society
is nigh impossible; decisionmakers invoking it are likely to be re-
ferring only to the views of the community with which they inter-
act and identify. Assuming consensus could be found, a value sys-
tem based on it would lack stability and represent law by popular
fiat.64 Consensus, consequently is either nonexistent, sporadic, or
concealing flagrantly elitist value preferences. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 38 (1978). See Tushnet, ". . . And Only Wealth Will Buy You
Justice"-Some Notes On the Supreme Court 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 177, 177.
60. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 24 (1975).
61. Idealist versions of natural law are invoked as a source of criticism of the existing
social order. Lacking a present authority source, supporters of change frequently appeal to a
higher order of directives. See J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 38 (1965).
62. Holmes compared natural law with the rules of English chivalry. "It is not enough
for the knight of romance that you agree that his lady is a very nice girl-if you do not
admit that she is the best that God ever made, you must fight. . . ." Holmes, Natural Law,
in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 557, 558 (F. Cohen & M. Cohen eds.
1979).
63. Consensus would not lack stability if it were based on some accepted transcenden-
tal value, but in such circumstances the source of ideology would not be consensus but
something akin to natural law. If the sole source of ideology is community consensus, the
system would fluctuate with every emotional wind that swept through the community. Any
new trend or demagogue could alter consensus, at least momentarily.
64. Such a system would be antithetical to a valid conception of a lawyer's role. See
note 24 and text accompanying notes 23-25 supra. Elimination of mob-rule and protection
of minority interests lie at the very foundation of a system of law. See Ingber, supra note 8,
at 863-67; note 24 supra. See also Ingber, Ideological Boundaries of Criminal Responsibil-
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dictatorial.
(d) Tradition
As considered in the discussion of precedent, tradition too de-
serves some deference because of the expectations that it may en-
courage. Tradition, however, as was also true of precedent, may
only be a guide to past wisdom rather than a prescription for fu-
ture behavior. Otherwise law would never grow and change but
would be straitjacketed by past judgments.6 5 Tradition deserves
respect but not blind adulation. Hence, the source of authority for
any ideology may not, on bottom, rest on tradition.
(e) The Constitution
The Constitution often is treated with the reverence of a holy
parchment. Values emanating from it would be infused with the
authority that is sought. As was also true for natural law, however,
the document's most significant clauses, such as the due process
and equal protection clauses, are too general or open-ended to re-
quire any specific result in specific cases. This recognition has led
one commentator to conclude that "there is simply no way for
courts to review legislation in terms of the Constitution without
repeatedly making difficult substantive choices among competing
values, and among inevitably controverted political, social and
moral conceptions." 6
Other jurists67 and scholars" have rejected the perception that
decisionmakers should inject substantive-that is, ideological-life
into constitutional provisions. Professor John Hart Ely presents a,
process-based theory of constitutional adjudication. 9 According to
ity, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 816, 842 (1980).
65. Justice Werner of the New York Court of Appeals so limited the development of
the law when, in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), he held work-
man's compensation to be unconstitutional. "Under our form of government," he argued,
"courts must regard all economic, philosophical and moral theories, attractive and desirable
though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question whether they can be molded
into statutes without infringing upon the letter or spirit of our written constitution." Id. at
287, 94 N.E. at 437. Since workman's compensation did not demand any finding of fault on
the part of the employer, and since fault had traditionally been required in suits by employ-
ees against their employers, the statute was found to violate due process.
66. L. TRIER, AimU=c CONsTrrunoNAL LAw 452 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
68. See J. ELY, DEMocRAcy AND DisTRusT 44-48 (1980). See generally R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
69. J. ELY, supra note 68.
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Ely, courts may overturn legislative determinations only when nec-
essary to correct imperfections of process that block the proper
functioning of the democratic process.70 He limits invocation of the
equal protection clause, for example, to those situations in which
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities." 1
Professor Ely's position, however, fails to insulate the equal
protection clause from the demand for ideology. Only equals need
to be treated equally; the allocation of justified status (non-equal-
ity) is clearly an ideological decision.72 Yet the document is silent
concerning which distinctions are acceptable. The conclusion that
a legislative classification is invalid springs from an ideological dis-
agreement with the judgment of status that lies behind the classifi-
cation. 78 The Constitution does not and cannot remove from the
decisionmaker the need personally to resolve ideological conflicts. 74
70. Id. at 101-04.
71. Id. at 76. Professor Ely is referring to Justice Stone's famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
72. A professor at a state university may get a key to the faculty library while students
do not. That discrimination is not deemed violative of the equal protection clause although
key allocation on the basis of race or sex likely would be. The appropriateness of his receiv-
ing the key is arguably based on an accepted distinction of merit. Yet "merit" is only entan-
gled components that imply social value. The designation is made in a discretionary manner
that is probably influenced by the degree of identification between those authorized to des-
ignate and those to be considered. Yet merit as a basis of unequal treatment is likely to be
viewed as a rational distinction. Weyrauch, Governance Within Institutions, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 141, 151 (1969).
73. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1075 (1980). Children, although persons for equal protection purposes, are
often denied the right to purchase alcohol or to sign binding contracts. This distinction is
acceptable because children are stereotyped as being immature, impulsive, and irra-
tional-essentially in need of supervision. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(state's authority over children's activities broader than over adults); Lobrano v. Nelligan,
76 U.S. 295 (1869) (legislature possesses power to determine how to preserve infant's es-
tates). Not long ago, however, women were treated differently from men based on precisely
the same justifications. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute exempting women
from jury duty not unconstitutional); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1949) (state may
deny women opportunity for bartending). The present unease with gender discrimination is
not due to any change in the constitutional document, but to a change of ideology. The
impact of such change is clear in constitutional adjudication because a single institution, the
United States Supreme Court, is responsible for most change and therefore is carefully stud-
ied. Ideology is equally significant in all law, such as tort and contract, but the lack of a
centrally significant institution to be studied often masks that reality.
74. Ely's process position itself appears to contain a subliminal ideology. While the
lack of representation of some groups in the political process may free the courts from any
responsibility to defer to legislative judgment, it gives no perspective on what the group
would have been entitled to in a properly functioning democratic system. "Even if the legis-
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C. Two Decisionmaking Hurdles
If inextricable rules do not preexist decisions and the process
of decisionmaking requires an ideological core that also lacks clear
prior authority, the fledgling legal decisionmaker's quest for the
truth, the answer-the holy grail-must be unsuccessful.75 He is
confronted by moral and ethical judgments that are not true or
false in any empirical sense.76 His first trauma comes when he is
forced to relinquish the icon of rules and certainty and is left fac-
ing a morass of ambiguity.7 Many problems affecting individuals
with hopes, dreams, and ambitions must be resolved, but no clear
solutions exist.
Recognition of the multiple levels at which the question "why"
may be asked ends the decisionmaker's trust in syllogism. It
presents, however, a second and greater hurdle. Unlike the philoso-
pher who can explore a problem, marvel at its intricacies, and
leave it for another day, the lawyer must decide within and in spite
of all ambiguity.7 8 He must work within a decisional dialectic that
lative resolution is not entitled to a presumption of correctness there is no reason to assume
that the opposite resolution would prevail. . . ." Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1, 9 (1979). How then, once free to be nondeferential, are jurists to decide
specific cases?
75. It would be erroneous to contend that if legislation exactly on point is found, there
is certainty. Codification and administrative rulemaking involve essentially the same value-
conflict settlement process found in the common law, but they are directed at future con-
flict. There is no guarantee that the statute or rule developed was ever wise or that it is
wisely or properly applied to any particular case. Those problems are for the lawyer to con-
sider just as in noncodified common-law situations. Even if the statute is "clear," the attor-
ney still must ask "why this statute?"--and accept the responsibility for his answer. See
note 29 supra.
76. Moral judgments are persuasive expressions of attitudes and not statements of fact
capable of being proved true or false. Ayers, On the Analysis of Moral Judgments, in LAW,
LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 557 (W. Bishin & C. Stone eds. 1972).
77. The trauma of this confrontation with ambiguity is strikingly portrayed in All the
King's Men, see R. WA4uus, supra note 35, when the realist, Willie Stark, confronts the
idealist, Dr. Adam Stanton:
"You got to make [goodness], Doc. If you want it. And you got to make it out of bad-
ness. Badness. And you know why, Doc?... Because there isn't anything else to make
it out of. .. ."
Adam wet his lips and said, "There is one question I should like to ask you. It is this.
If, as you say, there is only the bad to start with, and the good must be made from the
bad, then how do you ever recognize the good?..
"Easy, Doc, easy." [Willie] said.
"Well answer it."
"You just make it up as you go along."
Id. at 257.
78. Philosophical thinking is directed toward clarifying problems. Legal thinking, on
the contrary, is directed toward the solution of problems. Clients and courts ask questions.
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contains thesis and antithesis but lacks synthesis. There is nothing
but tension and the need to decide.
Deciding within ambiguity is a tortuous task. It requires that
one accept personal responsibility for one's decisions and their
impacts and affords no assurance that the decisions are not
"wrong."80 There is only the uncertainty whether one is acting as a
good Samaritan or abusing a missionary fervor.
In the secular religion of law, the lay community may, debata-
bly, need to believe in some sort of a deity. When the clergy also
believe, however, there is great danger, because then no one need
take responsibility for the decisions made. The necessity to accept
personal responsibility for one's decisions may be the hardest prin-
ciple for the budding attorney to accept."1
II. THE LAWYER AS DECISIONMAKER
A. Approaching Legal Problems
Part I presented law as a process by which lawyers make deci-
sions that are accepted as authoritative and legitimate.8 2 As par-
The lawyer must present answers. C. MoRRs, How LAWYERS THINK 3 (1938). While the
philosopher may be a scholar/observer, the lawyer must also be a participant. He must focus
on outcomes rather than on simple aesthetics. Even in his role as advocate, the lawyer must
accept responsibility for his decisions and their ramifications. For discussion of the decision-
making role of practitioners, see note 29 supra, notes 84 & 104 infra, and text accompanying
notes 82-104 infra.
79. The burden of personal responsibility can be awesome. Sartre, Existentialism and
Humanism, in LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHIcs, supra note 76, at 67.
80. See 1 S. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 29, at 440; Fiss, supra note 74, at 49. The more
the attorney understands his pivotal role in legal decisionmaking, the more difficult it is for
him to function. The lawyer who accepts the myth of law as rules may find his task easy.
Pierce that myth for him, instill in him a sense of personal responsibility for the impact of
his actions, and decisions once easily made will become significantly more complex and ex-
crutiating. The Grand Inquisitor emphasized this burden of decision in his discourse with
Christ:
Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the
knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of
conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering. And behold, instead of giving a
firm foundation for setting the conscience of man at rest for ever, Thou didst choose all
that is exceptional, vague and enigmatic; Thou didst choose what was utterly beyond
the strength of men, acting as though Thou didst not love them at all ....
F. Dos o-vsKv, supra note 27, at 261-62.
81. "And all will be happy, all the millions of creatures except the hundred thousand
who rule over them. For only we, we who guard the mystery, shall be unhappy." F. Dos-
ToEvsKY, supra note 27, at 267.
82. The perspective on law presented is based on law as a process of authoritative
decisionmaking and personal responsibility rather than law as a discoverable truth. This
view may not be the only valid perspective of law, yet it is an essential one, for it helps to
expose many of the frustrations and tensions inherent in legal education and practice.
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ticipants in this decisional process, lawyers must recognize that it
is the composite of their behavior that gives direction and content
to the law. s Their decisions inevitably injure some interests and
support others. When the factual context of a decision presents a
strong conflict between two highly prized interests-such as the
values of free speech and fair trials8 or the interests in pleasant
environmental surroundings and low-income housings--the pro-
cess can be agonizing for the decisionmaker 6 Even if one party,
when narrowly viewed, espouses interests deemed by some as un-
deserving of support, viewing the party's position more broadly
often exposes valued interests at stake.8 7 "The whole body of the
. . . law is made up of compromises of conflicting individual inter-
ests in which we turn to some social interest, frequently under the
name of public policy, to determine the limits of a reasonable
adjustment."88
Claude Monet painted multiple portraits of the Cathedral at Rouen believing only the mul-
tiple perspectives of the Cathedral would give the art appreciator a full understanding of
the beauty of the building. See G. HAMILTON, CLAUDE MONET'S PAINTING OF RoueN CATn-
DEAL 4-5, 19-20, 27 (1967). By itself, the legal perspective presented in this Article would be
deficient in revealing the edifice of law. Without it, however, other perspectives are also
unable to capture the essence of the legal process.
83. The practitioner, therefore, may not see his role simply as that of a hired gun. He
needs to concern himself with where to direct the law, what impact to cause, and why. The
"hired gun" perspective is a necessary view of law, however, for it is central to a "meaning-
ful coarchical and pluralistic society and a dialectical conception of truth." Reisman, supra
note 6, at 79.
84. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Irvin v. Down, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
85. E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.
1979).
86. One of the greatest social dilemmas is the determination of when and whether to
sacrifice the sanctity of the individual in order to attain other societally valued goals. The
legal system often provides the forum in which this difficult choice is made. See, e.g., Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (conflict between university's need
for a racially diverse student body and individual's interest in being judged solely on his
merits); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (conflict between societal interest in a
judiciary free from threat of suit and individual's due process rights). See generally Ingber,
Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785 (1979).
87. In N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), for example, de-
fendants successfully prevented the unionization, under the National Labor Relations Act,
of lay faculty members at two groups of Catholic high schools. On face value, the schools
appear to be attempting to keep their lay employees unorganized and, thus, in poor negoti-
ating positions. Parochial schools, however, have been severely strapped economically for
more than a decade. Keeping their workers unorganized also may be necessary to keep paro-
chial education economically viable. From this perspective both plaintiff and defendant are
representing important societal values.
88. Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
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Given this perspective on law, the individual is participating
in the process by which law is developed from the moment he en-
ters the dialogue of law school. He is expected to think through
and evaluate varying positions upon a problem, recognize and ac-
cept the responsibility for the impacts of his chosen position, com-
municate his decision to others, and attempt to convince them of
its preferability.89 If successful, his classmates may later go forward
and attempt to convince others-lawyers, judges, legislators, and
the like. And so law is "made."
The decisionmaker, be it student or lawyer, must, therefore,
candidly admit that he is taking part in a process of goal and value
clarification.90 To reject this admission is not to avoid participating
in the process but to do it blindly.91 Both student and lawyer must
perceive themselves as participants in the designing of law rather
than merely mechanics working on an already designed chassis.92
They must be trained accordingly.
Recognition of the role of lawyer as decisionmaker demands
that the training and interests of lawyers be more inclusive than
just a concern with the formal output of legal processes, namely
cases, legislation, and administrative decisions. Understanding the
informational input necessary to make such decisions should be
stressed equally.93
A lawyer must gather all relevant information and be aware of
all perspectives that influence the resolution of legal issues if he is
to make decisions that are most consistent with his desired values.
He must, therefore, be trained in philosophy, history, political sci-
13, at 238-39.
89. In this sense the legal process is a mechanism by which members of the commu-
nity may participate in a process for resolving ambiguity within a forum established for the
discussion of policy in the gap of ambiguity. Levi, supra note 35, at.963.
90. Reisman, supra note 6, at 98. The quest for truth, rather than the recognition of
choice, must be unsuccessful. "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by
events." James, Pragmatism-A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, in READINGS
IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 228.
91. See Holmes, supra note 44, at 467; Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The
Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 62, at 259.
92. See Holmes, supra note 44, at 477. Codified law does appear somewhat like a
"designed chassis." The statute itself, however, is subject to criticism and reevaluation both
in the legislative halls and in the courts (where it may be constitutionally attacked). In
addition, the meaning, coverage, and impact of a statute are often unclear, allowing lawyers
to press their views as the "proper" interpretations. See notes 42 & 75 supra.
93. Cook, Legal Thinking and the Process of Deciding a New Case, in LEGAL METHOD
AND LEGAL SysTvE 455 (W. Fryer & H. Orentlicher eds. 1967).
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ence, economics, psychology, and ethics. 4 In essence all disciplines
become part of the legal discipline when they are relevant to legal
decisionmaking. Time and efficiency constraints, however, make it
impossible for all relevant information and perspectives to be as-
similated prior to each decision. Consequently, one of the greatest
frustrations and anxieties lawyers encounter is the realization that
the assimilative task is never really completed before the decision
itself must be made.9 5
The lawyer is continually involved in a process of legal evalua-
tion, reconsideration, and reform. For him to participate in such a
process wisely, theories and the models derived from such theories
are essential,96 because, without them, the "law that is" cannot be
contrasted with "the law that ought to be." Models play three cru-
cial roles in evaluating a legal system. First, a model that is de-
scriptive of the present state of the system can further analysis of
the institutional relationships within the system. Each institution,
be it the legislature, the court, the jury, administrative agencies, or
the lawyer himself, places pressures and counterpressures both on
other institutions and on the system as a whole. Any attempt to
identify strengths or weaknesses without recognizing systemic in-
teraction will invite myopic, palliative measures of reform. Second,
designing a model forces its advocate to enunciate and clarify the
goals and purposes that the system is intended to fullfill.9 7 The
model can then be used to evaluate the system in light of these
goals, thus making it possible to construct an "ideal" or desired
system. Political, economic, or other pressures external to the legal
system, however, are likely to prevent the realization of this pre-
ferred state. Herein lies the third role of the model. By clarifying
the ideal, it allows a consideration of the ramifications of alterna-
tive compromises from the ideal. Greater use of theory and models
would enhance significantly the lawyer's ability to predict, plan for,
94. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 69 (1960). See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881). The rationality of law is not that of logic or of geometry but of economic calcula-
tions-"all things considered and weighing costs against advantage, x is better than y." L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 184 (1968).
95. Thus, the decisionmaker faces the risk that the effect of his decision may be quite
removed from what was intended, or an intended result may be achieved but with unex-
pected and undesired consequences.
96. "Theory," insisted Holmes, "is the most important part of the dogma of the law,
as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house."
Holmes, supra note 44, at 477.
97. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
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and evaluate the ramifications of his position."'
B. The Skill of Persuasion
Once a lawyer has made a decision, his next task is implemen-
tation. If he is not in a position to implement his decision alone, he
will need to resort to persuasion. He will attempt to articulate his
position in such a way as to convince others of its preferability."
This characteristic skill of persuasion is often viewed negatively by
the layman.100 The lawyer's linguistic talents are perceived as ma-
nipulative controls on the behavior of others. To the public, legal
thinking often appears to begin with conclusions rather than prem-
ises, and the lawyer appears to undertake the search for relevant
principles only as a final, ritualistic gesture. 101
The negative perception of persuasion is deserved only when
the decisionmaker has not resolved the problem himself and ac-
cepted personal responsibility for his resolution before attempting
to influence others. If this process has taken place, persuasion is
both honorable and respectful. The persuader does not demand
that those he seeks to influence accept his personal values and per-
spectives. Rather, he attempts to convince them of the efficacy of
his position within their own ideological system.10 2 It must be em-
phasized, however, that the skill of persuasion is ethically justifia-
98. Realists have long argued that judges should not seek to bootleg silently into the
law their own conceptions of the law's aims or of justice or social policy or other "extra-
legal" elements required for decision, but should openly identify and discuss these consider-
ations. Hart, supra note 9, at 978. But see text accompanying notes 220-30 infra.
99. Dworkin appears to be emphasizing this skill when he insists that an attorney
must seek a legal result that can be articulated and defended as "right." Dworkin, supra
note 13, at 1244-45.
100. Lawyers are best known for this skill, and the training within law schools tends to
accentuate it. Consider the common scenario in which the student is required to argue for
bath plaintiff and defendant using the same precedent. The plethora of precedents as well
as the varying methods of interpreting them have led rule-skeptics to conclude that the
most contradictory of decisions can be justified by precedent. D. WIoDOR, supra note 36, at
257.
101. The realists insist such is precisely the process of legal reasoning. Id. at 258-59.
Some decisionmakers have agreed. See Hutcheson, supra note 91, at 262.
102. Just as a French attorney would be remiss in using his own language rather than
English before an American judge, so must all decisionmakers translate their arguments into
the language of those to be convinced. Thus, if the judge before whom an attorney speaks
appreciates Founding Father arguments, the attorney should present such arguments
whether or not they are the basis by which he comes to his own position. Such an approach
is respectful, not demeaning, of the honor of the judge. Of course, the descriptive aspects of
the arguments presented must be empirically true; the Founding Fathers must have, in fact,
made such statements.
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ble'0 only when the artisan has first chosen his desired outcome
and accepted moral responsibility for its impact.
10 4
C. The Danger of the Task of Lawyering
The task of lawyering, as it has been argued, includes partici-
pation in a process of responsible decisionmaking and ethical per-
suasion. This perception, however, may lead the individuals who
once believed in rules-and certainty in the law-to become cyni-
cal.105 Law may appear to be based on nothing but a flip of the
coin or the idiosyncrasies of the individual decisionmaker.
Such cynicism may inhibit an understanding of the signifi-
cance of law:106 the uniqueness of its decisionmaking process and
its ability to limit or control potential abuses by the decisionmak-
ing elite.107 Enlightenment can weaken the mysteries that bestow
legitimacy upon institutions such as the law that are, at least par-
tially, based on faith.1 08 Thus, once the process of law is revealed
to be rule by elites, the formerly faithful are likely to become cyni-
cal unless the process' legitimacy can be reestablished by the dis-
covery of acceptable limitations on the rights and abilities of the
legal clergy to rule and affect others.109
103. The persuader must be wary of the many ethical dangers of his actions. For ex-
ample, the decisionmaker who frankly conveys the limitations and uncertainty of the posi-
tion that he is taking may find that others are more willing to follow the demagogue who
professes to offer certainty and truth. See, e.g., W. GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954). One
may be tempted, therefore, to overstate the strength of one's position in order to be
effective.
104. The advocate should not be able to shirk his moral responsibility simply by affili-
ating himself totally with the interests of his "client." Just as an attorney can refuse to serve
a client who is unwilling to pay his demanded fee, so he may also refuse a "client" whose
interests conflict with those the attorney feels are ethically and morally justifiable. The ad-
vocate, consequently, also is responsible for the impact of his behavior. Lest too narrow a
view be taken of what can be ethically justified, however, the criminal defense attorney may
ethically choose to defend a guilty client in order to protect and ensure the legal system's
integrity.
105. This attitude is the danger of the legal realist position.
106. An observer may distinguish, in any social process, a myth system that clearly
expresses all the rules and prohibitions and an operational code that tells "operators"-the
elite-when, by whom, and how things are and can be done. W. REISMAN, FOLDED LiEs 1
(1979). Knowledge of the code often leads to disillusionment with the myth system.
107. Law must serve such a function unless a legal system made up of decisionmakers
who simply "grind whatever political ax [they] prefer on a particular day" is acceptable.
Ely, supra note 59, at 5.
108. Similarly, it may be asked whether "the saying of the Mass in the vernacular
[forebode] the beginning, or the end, of the relevance of that sacrament to the lives of the
believers." Deutsch, supra note 39, at 261.
109. "May we not suggest to the pragmatic jurist the importance of taking on board
... protections against the hurricane of social wants and demand some instrumentali-
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The key to avoiding such cynicism lies in the source of legiti-
mate authority. The etiology of legitimate authority affects the
range of the clergy's authority and the extent of an individual's
political and moral obligation to obey the clerically made law.110
Cynicism can be avoided if the process of legitimizing a decision is
seen as a means of controlling the controllers."""
III. THE ROLE OF LAW
Possessing the power to make decisions affecting others is dis-
tinct from possessing the authority that imparts legitimacy upon
such decisions. 1"2 Decisions made and implemented solely on the
basis of power do not inspire the acceptance that assures compli-
ance and finality. Power can confront power in a never-ending cy-
cle of escalating controversy. Law without authority and legitimacy
is no law at all,"1 ' for it cannot fulfill the multiple roles of peace
keeper,"14 conflict settler, value articulator," 5 or societal edu-
cator. 1"
6
Even in a society that embraces the rhetoric of democracy, law
created by the decisional elite plays precisely such roles. The ac-
ceptance of law is so great that nonelected jurists are given the
right to make ultimate decisions; their interpretations of constitu-
tional provisions are given a right to demand compliance superior
to that given any legislative action." 7 The question thus arises of
how these decisions, if made by legal elites and neither ideologi-
cally neutral nor neutrally derivable by processes of reason and
logic, have gained such acceptance. Why are they not perceived as
ties-in the shape of permanent constitutional principles and natural rights-before we en-
gage passage with him." Kennedy, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, in READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 250. The fear of judges intentionally or unwittingly enact-
ing into law their own preferences in the name of having discovered the true meaning of
equality or liberty is precisely the risk that has served to justify a process-based theory of
constitutional adjudication. Fiss, supra note 74, at 11.
110. R. DWORKIN, TAKINo RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 5 (1977).
111. On controlling the controllers, see generally Ingber, supra note 8.
112. The gun-toting robber may oblige me to act as he wishes, but I feel no moral
obligation to cooperate.
113. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
114. See Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
699, 718-19 (1978).
115. Fiss, supra note 74, at 9.
116. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193,
208 (1952).
117. Many critics, uncomfortable with this arrangement, have tried to limit its impact.
See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 68. Others feel that it is inevitable if the Court is to function
properly. L. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 452.
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manipulation by an elite, whether benevolent or otherwise?118
A. Law As Mask
1. Masking Ideology
Often the ideological basis or significance of a decision is con-
cealed.1 19 The legal process frequently succeeds in refocusing the
conflict among values away from the intense ideological plane to
the less impassioned levels of process 12q-that of procedure,1 2 cer-
emony,122 and rhetoric.123 This shift in focus clouds the ideological
basis of a decision while giving the parties to any conflict between
change and stability and their supporters the impression that an
avenue is open for obtaining both resolution of their conflict 12 4 and
118. Some individuals, radicals and otherwise, have viewed law in this manner. See E.
CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE, 128-37 (1968). Judge Learned Hand also rejected the authority of a
decisional elite. "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." L. HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
119. See Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (pt. 2), 27 HARV. L. RV.
344, 366 (1914). For a more detailed consideration of this phenomenon, see generally
Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological Conflict in
Deviance Control, 56 B.U. L. REv. 266 (1976).
120. As Judge Learned Hand observed,
Judges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before them; they do
not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the legislator's
solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their veto
in a protective veil of adjectives such as "arbitrary," "artificial," "normal," "reasona-
ble," "inherent," "fundamental," or "essential," whose office usually, though quite in-
nocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more
impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the
decision....
L. HAND, supra note 118, at 70.
121. "Procedure" as used herein includes the rules that dictate the particular way in
which institutions are required to function internally in their effort to fulfill their appropri-
ate purposes.
122. "Ceremony" as used herein refers to a set of acts prescribed by ritual, protocol, or
convention that, although often performed with great formality, have little practical
significance.
123. "Rhetoric" as used herein means the use of language, sometimes unsupported by
deeds, that creates an impression of the normative position and intensity of commitment of
the writer or speaker.
124. A literary example of the use of procedure as a method of conflict settlement
masking problems of ideology is Shirley Jackson's short story, The Lottery, in THE LOTTERY
291 (1949). The society Jackson describes in The Lottery has no predilection against indi-
vidual sacrifice for collective goals. In fact, it prefers such an arrangement. The story de-
scribes a communal ceremony wherein lots are drawn to determine who will be stoned to
death for some unspecified community need. Although the eventual winner of the lottery
objects, the objection is couched in terms of procedure-that the lots were drawn too quick-
ly-and not directed at the substance of the activity. Id. at 299.
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official support of their positions.12
Conflicts over the justification and content of summary rules
(over ideology) are transformed when decisions are articulated in
terms of conformity with rules of a practice12 -- the rules of the
game.12 7 Accomplishment of this transformation depends on pro-
cess success being perceived as true success; parties to the contro-
versy must be satiated by a process victory or mollified by suffer-
ing only a process defeat.128
The use of procedure, ceremony, or rhetoric, however, rarely
leads to truly value-free decisions. Rather, the decisions, although
couched in process terms, may have considerable ideological im-
pact. This impact may take one of two forms. First, resort to con-
siderations of process can shift the focus of conflict to nonideologi-
cal levels, allowing a resolution that masks the continuation of the
125. The struggle for official support of a position often causes the idea of right and
wrong, the ethical-juridical conception, to be overshadowed by emphasis upon which groups
"win" and which "lose," the purely agonistic conception. See J. HUIZINGA, HoMo LUDENS: A
STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 78 (1950). In Greenland, for example, an Eskimo
who has a complaint against another challenges him to a drumming contest. Id. at 85. The
agonistic nature of this form of conflict resolution is readily apparent. Eskimo society, being
in a less "advanced" phase of cultural development, has not developed the subtleties by
which more developed societies conceal the battle element of conflict resolution.
126. See discussion on rules at note 33 and text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
127. Such rules, or what may be labeled as "lawyer's law," include such considerations
as standing, ripeness, vagueness, and improper delegation. Even equal protection arguments
often serve as rules of a practice that conceal ideological determinations. While presented as
if only demanding precision of "fit" between legislative classifications and purposes, such
arguments camouflage their resolution of the ethical command that only equals need be
treated equally, a command that requires an ideological conclusion. See text accompanying
notes 71-74 supra.
128. See Weyrauch, supra note 114, at 717-19.
Of course, some parties may not succumb to procedural machinations. The resultant
ideological tension of refusal to accept a procedural decision as a valid conflict resolution is
cleverly illustrated by the protest of Alice before the King in Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland.
At this moment the King, who had been for some time busily writing in his note-book,
called out "Silence!" and read out from his book, "Rule Forty-two. All persons more
than a mile high to leave the court."
Everybody looked at Alice.
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice.
"You are," said the King.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
"Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; "besides, that's not a regular rule: you in-
vented it just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.
The King turned pale, and shut his notebook hastily. "Consider your verdict," he said
to the jury, in a low trembling voice.
L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 156 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (emphasis in original).
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challenged ideological position.12 9 Second, by requiring excessively
complicated or expensive procedures or ceremonies for the fulfill-
ment of the goals of the recognized victor, behavior patterns sup-
portive of a different ideology may be encouraged without a direct
challenge to the "victor's" ideology.130 In both cases the ideological
impact of the decisions may not be readily apparent, thus reducing
any difficulty in gaining their acceptance.
2. Masking Humanity
More than ideology may be masked by law. Considered earlier
was the maxim that this is a nation of law and not men, and the
interpretation suggesting that law was somehow untainted by man
was rejected.131 Ideological decisions are inherent in legal decision-
making. This fact does not mean that the maxim is meaningless,
but only that its meaning is more subtle. It connotes a system in
which value decisions are to be made at a high level of generality,
in order to deal with classes of behavior and individuals, rather
than a system allowing ad hoc determinations in individual cases.
Whether law develops by legislation or through the common-law
mechanism of case-by-case adjudication, the individual case must
act as an instrument for carving out the policy to be used by the
institutions confronting human problems. By insisting on "the rule
of law" or "the principle of legality," the controllers can be con-
trolled and the subjectivity inherent in the exercise of discre-
tion-decisionmaking rendered in the absence of rules-can be
limited. The crucial consideration is not whether discretion enters
the system, but whether its entrance takes place at a sufficiently
129. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court, through use of
rhetoric and an addition of ceremony, placated the black, the indigent, and the liberal and
academic communities by giving them a taste of success and formal support for their claims
of right. Their triumph, however, was symbolic only;, the waiver provision allowed by Mi-
randa gives the decision minimal limiting impact upon police conduct. The ideology of "law
and order"--the efficient detection and prosecution of those individuals who threaten the
social order-remains secure. See Ingber, supra note 119, at 273-95.
130. The right to treatment for those civilly committed has significantly reduced the
use of such commitment while ostensibly accepting the justification of commitment. Ingber,
supra note 119, at 307-21. The ideology supporting the death penalty may also now be suf-
fering from the same erosion. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980)
(juror may not be challenged for cause because of views about capital punishment unless
views prevent performance of duties); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980)
(jury must be instructed as to all lesser included offenses); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978)
(statute may not limit factors to be considered as mitigating circumstances); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (total presentencing report must be disclosed to defendant or
his counsel).
131. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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general level of abstraction to avoid particularization of law as the
"rule of men. 13 2 Justice becomes a concept of consistency of treat-
ment that appears unbiased on a personal/contextual level.133
As also argued earlier, however, rules made in the process of
their application cannot be totally general; adequate generality is
all that can be demanded. The proper degree and extent of catego-
rization, the determination of which differences are and which are
not significant, is always subject to disagreement and debate.134
The need for categorization at some level, however, is clear.
Yet the process of categorization must, by definition, conceal
much of that which makes a given conflict unique-masking the
very humanity of the problem. Because the study of law empha-
sizes concepts and rules, it inevitably trains students in the use of
masks to conceal the problem of humanity. Professor John Noonan
has bitterly attacked these masks of law that serve to "[classify]
individual human beings so that their humanity is hidden and dis-
avowed. 13 5 Focusing on the function of law to channel and to
teach,136 he insists that the articulation of law "affect[s] attitude
and conduct as communications from persons to persons. '13 7 He
stresses the manner in which the language of "property" or "chat-
132. The due process requirement of notice can be explained from this perspective. In
a system that insists that ignorance of the law is no defense, see W. LAFAvE & A. ScOTr,
HANDBOOK ON CRimiNAL LAW 356 (1972), the concept of fair notice is a fiction unless citizens
are expected to read and interpret all statutes enacted and all decisions rendered. While
such an expectation is unrealistic, controllers (lawyers, judges, police, etc.) properly could be
required to be so aware. Decisions made at higher levels of abstraction can limit controller
behavior in specific cases. See Ingber, supra note 8, at 863-68.
133. Justice defined at least partially as the appearance of consistency explains the
tendency to federalize (or unify) the rules of criminal procedure. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). While state and federal courts work
under very different conditions and tensions that might influence legitimately their rules of
procedure, the difficulty in explaining and justifying disparate due process rights in institu-
tions that appear so similar militates against separate development of state and federal
rights.
134. Adequate generality in criminal law appears to demand a much higher level of
abstraction than that demanded in tort law. Criminal law has thus moved toward a system
of codified law, abandoning the use of common-law crimes. Torts, on the contrary, reserves
to the jury the determination of the proper behavior within the context of the case. This
discrepancy may be explained by a fundamental difference of purpose between the two sys-
tems of allocating responsibility. Criminal law, in order to make violation a moral issue,
unifies legal and moral guilt. Thus, articulated and knowable standards are required. Tort
law, concerned with reducing accidents and injury, avoids setting standards that once at-
tained would cease to apply pressure for improvement.
135. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 19 (1976).
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 4.
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tel" was used to mask the inhumanity of slavery."' 8
Ethnologists studying the relation of language to culture have
long concurred that language constitutes an influence on both per-
ception and conception.13 9 Edward Sapir, an early leader in ethnol-
ogy, has written:
The relation between language and experience is often misunderstood. Lan-
guage is not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items
of experience which seem relevant to the individual, as is so often naively
assumed, but is also a self-contained, creative symbolic organization, which
not only refers to experience largely acquired without its help but actually
defines experience for us by reason of its formal completedness and because
of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectation into the field of
experience. 140
While one can deplore the extent to which the language of law
can limit the perception of its impact and reality, one may ask, as
does Professor Walter Weyrauch, whether the masking of unique-
ness is not inherent as a concept of relevance in any form of rea-
soning.141 The principle of legality requires inattentiveness to most
of what makes cases human; such attentiveness would lead to ad
hoc, uncontrolled decisions. 42 Thus, the process of categorization
focuses the task of the decisionmaker, but this very process of fo-
cusing removes from view the uniqueness of the conflicts and the
individuals within the category. The issue, therefore, becomes one
of properly defining the scope of the category-that is, adequate
generality. 143
If masks are inevitably related to categories or abstractions
138. Id. at 29-64. While categorization must conceal what is unique about a given con-
flict, creation of the category itself may be motivated by humanitarian interests. The devel-
opment of a category of "fundamental rights" that warrant heightened judicial protection is
such a case.
139. See, e.g., R. BROWN, I. Copi, D. DULANEY, W. FRANKENA, P. HENLE & C. STEVEN-
SON, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND CULTURE 1-24 (1958); Sapir, Language, in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF EDWARD SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY 7-32 (D. Mendelbaum ed. 1949);
Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CUL-
TURE AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (L. Spier, A. Hollowell & S.
Newman eds. 1941).
140. Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE
AND SocIErY 128 (D. Hymes ed. 1964).
141. Weyrauch, supra note 114, at 708.
142. Compared with appellate proceedings, trials allow a great deal of humanity to
enter the legal process. Yet even at trial, evidentiary and procedural restrictions bar intro-
duction of many of the human aspects of the factual situation. These exclusions are all
attempts to limit the ad hoe nature of and create a degree of uniformity in trial outcomes.
143. So viewed, the essence of Noonan's position appears not to be that such a concept
as "property" should be rejected, but that humans should never be perceived within its
ambits.
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and if categories and abstractions, in turn, are an inextricable part
of legal analysis, the appropriateness of a particular mask in a par-
ticular context must be assessed. Masks function in three ways.
First, a category may exclude overt consideration of a factor that is
actually influencing decisions. Such a mask allows the legal system
to conceal its actions through intellectual dishonesty.14 4 Second, a
mask may exclude consideration of factors that some individuals
believe should be considered. In essence, the critics of the category
are rejecting its underlying values. 5 Finally, categories serve to
exclude that which their supporters insist should be ex-
cluded-factors that are viewed as irrelevant, such as bias and fa-
voritism. This third category, like the second, demands an ideolog-
ical determination of the contours of relevancy. The debate
between Weyrauch and Noonan stems from Noonan's normative
use of the term "mask" to signify a disfavored process, thus en-
compassing only the first two functional types listed above.
Weyrauch, however, uses the term descriptively and thus includes
all three types within its definition.
Weyrauch, unlike Noonan, focuses on law as peacekeeper.14"
Categorization, thus, serves not only to control controllers but also
to make decisional outcomes more acceptable. Parties are not con-
fronted by a decisional system determining their personal stature.
Party conflicts are merely the forces that initiate the process of
articulation of societal values. 147 "Legal masks, like physical masks
in ancient societies," observes Weyrauch, "satisfy the quasi-reli-
gious faith of people in the righteousness and neutrality of adjudi-
cation. As a result, the masks of objectivity, neutrality, and fair-
ness give the legal process an independent power so that it is not
merely the tool of dominant social forces." 4 8
While those who emphasize law as educator may differ with
144. State v. Johnson, 84 S.C. 45, 65 S.E. 1023 (1909) is a blatant example of this
function of masks. The black defendant, finding a white woman he had known for many
years sitting despondently on the porch of her home, approached her, placed his hands on
her shoulders, and asked if she wished to go inside and speak to him about what was troub-
ling her. He was convicted of assault. While the court discussed at length the necessary
"mens rea" of the crime, the conviction of assault for such innocuous behavior can really be
understood only on the basis of the social taboos concerning race that existed in South
Carolina at the time.
145. Noonan's slavery example served predominantly this function.
146. Weyrauch, supra note 114, at 715, 718-19.
147. Such is Owen Fiss' view of the judicial requirement of case and controversy. Fiss,
supra note 74, at 29-30.
148. Weyrauch, supra note 114, at 718. See also T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERN-
MENT 34 (1935).
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those who emphasize its peacekeeping role in their evaluation of a
particular mask's use, both would likely recognize the role that
"levels of generality" play in limiting the discretion of deci-
sionmakers and increasing the acceptability of resulting decisions.
Both the principle of legality (or levels of generality) and the roles
of procedure, ceremony, and rhetoric may reduce the appearance
of, or the negative response to, elite ideological decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, when critically analyzed, these decisions have signifi-
cant ideological impact. The question of their legitimacy thus
remains.
B. The Legitimation of Law: The Relationship Between
Process and Substance as a Limitation of Law
H.L.A. Hart describes the legal process as the union of pri-
mary and secondary rules. 149 Primary rules are the outputs of the
process-the "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots" that the legal
system directs at the public-at-large. Secondary rules are precepts
concerning the workings of the process by which primary rules are
derived.150
For Hart, the process of validation, or legitimacy, focuses on
his secondary rule of recognition. The secondary rule of recognition
is the ultimate rule of a system, for its fulfillment transforms law
as a command based on threat to law as a valid obligation based on
acceptance and legitimacy. Those primary rules that are derived
by processes identified by the secondary rule of recognition are
deemed by the public as authorized. The content of the rule of
recognition is a function of culture and socialization: 51
The use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts and others, in identi-
fying particular rules of the system is characteristic of the internal [or social-
ized] point of view. Those who use them in this way thereby manifest their
own acceptance of them as guiding rules .... We can indeed simply say that
149. Hart, Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE NATURE OF
LAW 144 (M. Golding ed. 1966).
150. According to Hart, the defects of primitive legal systems are their uncertainty,
inefficiency, and static nature. Mature legal systems have secondary rules of recognition,
adjudication, and change to deal with these corresponding defects. Id. at 144-52.
151. Socialization, according to Lon Fuller, "is the process whereby a person comes to
perceive, respect, and participate in the creation of the reciprocal expectations that arise out
of human interaction." Fuller, Some Presuppositions Shaping the Concept of "Socializa-
tion", in LAw, JUSTICE AND THE INvmiUAL iN SocirY 37 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977).
Reference to symbols of stability and authority such as language deducible from the consti-
tutional document often serve in our culture to increase the appearance of validity. Use of
such references are expected and, therefore, are encompassed within the socialized rule of
recognition.
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the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the
criteria provided by the rule of recognition.
15 2
Hart essentially insists that fulfillment of process rules gives legiti-
macy to substantive results of the process. He fails, however, to
explain the mechanism by which the process gains acceptance. A
system or process that spews out an overall acceptable stream of
primary rules is likely itself to be imbued with legitimacy. Sub-
stance, thus, may also support process. This interplay must be ex-
posed in order to view clearly the relationship between process and
substance. A useful illustration of this phenomenon is provided by
an analogy to a bank account.
1. The Substantive Bank Account of Legitimacy
General public knowledge of legal decisions focuses primarily
on the impact of those decisions rather than on the form that they
take or the process by which they are derived.15 3 Decisional out-
comes that are supportive of the public's values and perspectives
serve to increase or confirm the public's acceptance of the system
making such decision. The more those affected by legal decisions
identify with or are sympathetic to the values supported by such
decisions, the more the system itself is perceived as a surrogate of
self-discipline and, thus, as acceptable. 1"
Rhetoric supportive of representative democracy is based
upon predictions that outcomes of such a governmental process are
likely to be consistent with popularly embraced values. When such
decisions are made, the legal system may be thought of as putting
a deposit into its "legitimacy account." When the decision is incon-
sistent, a withdrawal takes place. While every withdrawal may
152. Hart, supra note 149, at 153.
153. Deutsch, supra note 39, at 216. Questions of form and derivation are more the
concerns of the elite themselves as participants in the decisional process or as members of a
community of expert critics.
154. Isaiah Berlin has theorized two concepts of liberty. Negative liberty is defined as
the extent to which the individual is left unregulated or unrestricted by the state. Positive
liberty is the extent to which the individual identifies with the source of the regulations and
thereby perceives them to be legitimate. I. BERLIN, Two CONcEPrs OF LIBERTY (1958). The
tradition of American democracy emphasizes the rhetoric of positive liberty. See J. LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIviL GOVERNMENT (1946). This statement is not meant to suggest,
however, that American jurisprudence is based only upon positive liberty. The importance
of the Bill of Rights, representing negative liberty in the American system of government, is
clear and is a focus of legal activity. It is suggested only that the rhetoric used to give the
American system legitimacy is more that of positive liberty, and that this rhetoric affects
our perceptions of governmental activities. A government "by, for, and of the people" can-
not easily be deemed unauthorized when making regulations for the welfare of the people.
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cause some public criticism, only at the point where withdrawals
exceed deposits does the system lose its legitimacy and become in-
effectual. A system with extensive deposits in its legitimacy ac-
count is valuable and worthy of support whether or not it occasion-
ally makes decisions of which one disapproves. If legitimacy 5 5 is
recognized as the essence of authority, law cannot be merely deci-
sions of the elite. The elite may retain their positions only by ac-
cepting the constraints imposed by the public over whom they
"rule." When account withdrawals, because of frequency or inten-
sity, outstrip deposits for any individual or group, such individuals
or groups no longer have reason to support the system. The con-
trollers, therefore, have a legitimacy limitation upon their power
and discretion.
2. Legitimacy Withdrawals
The heterogeneity of American society makes it impossible to
expect any given decision to increase the legal system's legitimacy
account for all. Such a reaction would presuppose unanimous ac-
ceptance of a single, totally general system of value. As has already
been argued, however, within specific contexts there are often ir-
reconcilable tensions between honored values.15 6 Every decision, by
necessity, will result in withdrawals by some.
More importantly, however, no decisional institution can af-
ford, like hoarders of money, to concern itself only with increasing
its capital. The legitimacy that allows institutions to be effective is
significant only if, at appropriate times, withdrawals are made. It is
at these times that law serves to educate and direct society rather
than conform to and follow it. 157 A system of law must contribute
something beyond what could be accomplished by a system of
popular flat. 15 8
155. Legitimacy in this sense is a comparatively unrefined concept. Such legitimacy is
not dependent upon popular approval of any given institution's performance and even less
so upon such approval of the processes through which that performance is rendered. It is
the legitimacy of the decisional system as a whole that depends on the people's approval.
Fiss, supra note 74, at 8. For a discussion of the integrity of specific legal institutions, see
text accompanying notes 179-210 infra.
156. Consider the tension between racial equality and individual merit exemplified by
such cases as Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
157. Wechsler, for example, while attacking as unprincipled the segregation cases such
as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), also recognized that these cases "have the
best chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society of any that I
know in recent years." H. WECHSLER, supra note 51, at 37.
158. Many significant constitutional cases are also those that were attacked most stri-
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This view provides an answer for the perennial question of
whether law leads or follows social change. It does both. Judges,
legislators, and lawyers, being socialized by society and given posi-
tions of authority through the retained legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem, would not and cannot for long make decisions that are not in
conformity with the dominant cultures of society. On those rare
occasions of sufficiently significant moment, however, deci-
sionmakers may feel ethically and morally compelled to lead and
redirect society. A withdrawal of capital is made.
Withdrawals are risky, however. A too extensive withdrawal
may not only limit the acceptance of a given decision, but may
decrease the efficacy of an institution to handle other such deci-
sions in the future.159 Consequently, when legal institutions antici-
pate that a decision may cause such withdrawals, they often leave
a safety-valve open to enable them to gauge and, if necessary, to
reduce the negative impact of their decisions upon their legitimacy.
Consider, for example, the risk taken by the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticutl60 when it first enunciated a constitution-
ally protected right of privacy encompassing a married couple's
right to use contraceptives. Lacking any specific constitutional lan-
guage referring to either privacy or procreation, the varied opin-
ions striking down the state's century-old ban on contraceptives
smacked of the then unpopular doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess-despite protestations to the contrary.161 The development of
dently. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-98 (1962) (criticizing Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); H. WECHSLER, supra note 51, at 36-48 (criticizing Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954)); Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: An All-
American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 843 (1979) (criticizing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973));
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665 (1970)
(criticizing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). Of course, at those times when law educates
and leads society, it is most open to the accusation of elitism.
159. In considering the Supreme Court's invalidation of federal statutes aimed at ame-
liorating the depression of the 1930s, Professor Ira Lupu contends that the court, by 1937,
"had exhausted its interventionist capital, and had thoroughly discredited itself as a sensi-
tive and responsible institution of government." Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 77 MiCH. L. Rav. 981, 989 (1979). The continued authority of the insti-
tution itself was in jeopardy.
160. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
161. "Substantive due process" had become a cue for the discredited interventionist
stance struck by the Court while invalidating New Deal legislation in the 1930s. The pre-
mise of the Court's decisions at that time was that government inaction would allow the
marketplace to arrive undisturbed at the optimal point of efficiency. See Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Economists have
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a new legal doctrine of privacy in the highly impassioned context
of birth-control could reasonably have been expected to cost the
institution dearly.
The Court acted assertively and found the Connecticut statute
unconstitutional. Justice Douglas, however, made a fascinating
statement in the course of his majority opinion. He described the
statute as one that "in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather
than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals
by means having a maximum destructive impact upon [the mari-
tal] relationship."l
The statute apparently was most objectionable because it for-
bade the use rather than the manufacture, distribution, or sale of
contraceptive devices. Yet the ability of a married couple to prac-
tice birth-control would clearly be limited, if not terminated, by a
ban that ended the availability of commercially produced contra-
ceptive devices. Why, then, the curious distinction between use on
the one hand, and manufacture and sale on the other?
Griswold, at the time it was decided, could have been viewed
simply as a case concerning methods of statutory enforcement. In-
vestigating violations of a "use" statute would require physical in-
vasion of the intimacy of the marital chamber. The image of police
searching the bedroom for clues or interrogating married couples
about their sexual behavior is considerably more troubling within
our culture than the investigation of commercial centers, as would
be involved in a ban on manufacture, distribution, or sale. The in-
validation of a use statute on such grounds thus may be acceptable
to most people (even to many opposed to contraceptives), espe-
cially if a commercial activity ban might still be possible.
Thus, while a commercial ban was not explicitly rejected, an
anticontraceptive statute enacted in a different era1e3 by a constit-
uency long since past was struck from the books. A contemporary
since rejected this premise, recognizing that when law is indifferent to detrimental social
and economic inequalities, those conditions become frozen and self-perpetuating. American
constitutional law rejected laissez-faire economics after the early 1930s, allowing legislatures
rather than courts to have prominence in determining the economic well-being of the com-
munity. In Griswold, however, the Court refused to allow legislatures to determine society's
moral well-being as well. It was difficult, however, for the court to distinguish between Loch-
ner, with all its alleged flaws, and Griswold. Compare 381 U.S. at 481-82 (Douglas, J., distin-
guishing Griswold from Lochner) with 381 U.S. at 510-18 (Black, J., extolling the similarity
between Griswold and Lochner).
162. 381 U.S. at 485.
163. Connecticut first enacted a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives in 1879.
Id. at 527.
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Connecticut constituency might not demand such a statute, and
yet the legislature might feel unable to repeal it, for the symbolic
effect of repealing a law is far greater than that of not passing
one. 1 4 While not enacting a law may be interpreted as societal ig-
norance or indifference, the act of repeal is perceived as sanction-
ing that which was formerly outlawed. The legislative behavior
seems more a reversal of the earlier statutory communication that
the act was objectionable, and less a return to noninvolvement by
the state."" Laws, hence, might not be repealed even though they
remain largely unenforced. Court action deprived Connecticut leg-
islators of the ability both to have an anticontraceptives statute on
the books and remain uninvolved with the issue.
Implicit in the Griswold decision was the presumption that
autonomy in procreation decisions (at least for married couples)
was a sufficiently significant value to require constitutional sup-
port; but in case the reaction to the decision was too severe-too
widespread or intense-a safety-valve was left open. Legislators
had not been foreclosed from passing a commercial ban on contra-
ceptives, thus reducing any legitimacy withdrawal caused by Gris-
wold.166 In this case, the safety-valve was not used; it appears that
no state has passed such a statute. This reaction-gauging device is
often used to evaluate and deflate potentially negative reactions to
decisions through which quantum (rather than incremental)
changes in law take place. 1
7
164. See A. BIcrmL, supra note 158, at 143-56.
165. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), is a case on point. The California Con-
stitution had been amended so as to repeal all state open housing legislation. The state
contended that there was no more state action supporting private racial discrimination in
repealing such statutes than there would have been had no statute been enacted in the first
place. The Supreme Court disagreed, viewing the repeal as having the effect of official ap-
proval and encouragement of such discrimination.
166. This point is not to suggest that such legislation would have been found constitu-
tional. By leaving the issue unresolved, however, the Court softened the response to Gris-
wold and provided a mechanism by which the states could communicate their rejection of
the Court's position.
167. The Court also resorted to the safety-valve mechanism in the death penalty cases.
Most death penalty statutes, like the ban on contraceptive devices, were originally passed in
a different era. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court found such statutes
unconstitutional, not because the death penalty was intrinsically a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, but because their utilization was arbitrary and erratic. As it had done in Griswold,
the Court ended the effect of potentially dated statutes while leaving the public an opportu-
nity to "nullify" its ban on executions by enacting new death penalty systems not subject to
such procedural abuses. In the case of capital punishment, 35 states, responsive to a public
outcry against the Furman decision, redrafted their death penalty statutes. In Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court, confronted by this fact, found the death penalty
constitutional. The Justices were unprepared to accept too great a withdrawal from their
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Essentially, law can lead social change only as far as society is
willing to allow.168 The universe of alternative decisions accepted
as possible by the dominant culture, including both preferred and
unpreferred alternatives, has been labeled as the "community
agenda of alternatives."1 9 Although the legal system may not
make decisions outside of that agenda, it may symbolically support
an unpreferred alternative within the agenda. The law can thus
lead society as long as it does not do so too frequently, thus deplet-
ing its legitimacy reserves. 17 0
Institutions need not just passively accept the limitations of
the agenda. Language, or rhetoric, may be used as a tool to influ-
ence the contents of the agenda.171 Rhetoric may pave the way for
change by slowly acclimating the public to new values. Rhetoric,
for example, played a role in the development of the legal response
to racial segregation. When in 1896 the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
legitimacy account. The focus of the death penalty conflict now has turned from questions
of ideology to questions of process. See also the discussion on masks of ideology at text
accompanying notes 119-30 supra.
168. Yehezhel Dror, in his study of law as social reformer in Turkey, concluded that
aspects of social action of a mainly instrumental character, such as commercial activities,
were significantly influenced by new law. Those aspects of social action involving expressive
activities and basic beliefs and institutions, such as family life and marriage habits, were
very little changed despite explicit laws trying to shape them. Dror, Law and Social Change,
in SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 96-97 (V. Aubert ed. 1969).
169. Deutsch, supra note 39, at 254. Nelson Polsby has observed that the community
agenda of alternatives accounts for the empirically observable phenomenon that "[s]ome,
perhaps most, possible alternatives are never considered in community decisionmaking." N.
POLSBY, COMMUNITY PowER AND PoLITIcAL THEORY 133 (1963). Of course, the agendas for
national and local communities may not coincide. Consequently, federal courts may find it
easier to overturn state and local laws rather than enactments of Congress.
170. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A contempo-
rary example of this phenomenon is the movement for equal treatment of the sexes. At one
time the community feeling about women was that they did not need to be accorded the
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment because they were
different from men, being weaker, less self-sufficient, and less mature. Only after the ideol-
ogy and, accordingly, the community agenda of alternatives changed did a small core of
individuals begin fighting for equality for women. Once women's equality was demonstrated
by the actions of this social core to be acceptable as a possible, although not preferred,
alternative, those involved in legal institutions could begin to move law in an attempt to
lead society. For a discussion of the crucial question of how an alternative initially beyond
the community agenda comes to be accepted into it, see Ingber, supra note 8, at 886-89.
171. For law's role as educator, see C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86
(1960); Rostow, supra note 116, at 208. A comparison can be made to the use of cloud
chambers in physics to trace the paths of sub-microscopic atomic particles. A box is filled
with gas that ionizes when brought in contact with a particle. A vapor path is thus created.
Scientists cannot determine, however, whether the presence of the gas causes the particle
being investigated to deviate from its normal path. So, too, the language of the law may not
only trace the path of society, it may also affect the direction that society takes.
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Ferguson17 2 developed the principle of "separate but equal," no
state, not even those in the South, complained because there
seemed to be no threat to segregation. For the first time, however,
the rhetoric of equality in public facilities began to percolate
through the legal system. 17  Soon the language of separate but
equal in education led to demands for actual equality in such tan-
gible factors as buildings, curricula, teacher qualifications, and sal-
aries.1 7' As the language of Freudian psychology entered American
society, the existence of intangible factors made separate but equal
a virtual impossibility. Although a statement of total and immedi-
ate equality of the races at the time of Plessy conceivably could
have led to a second civil war, the acceptance of the language of
equality at the turn of the century led to Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,17 5 which outlawed segregation in public schools, nearly
sixty years after Plessy. Acceptance of the fiction of equality by
the states after Plessy as a means of preserving the policy of segre-
gation ultimately allowed public acceptance of the policy's official
downfall in Brown.17  The societal limitation upon legal decisions
obviously is not itself immune from the influence of such decisions.
In summary, not only does fulfillment of accepted process le-
gitimize substance, as Professor Hart claimed,1 77 but the opposite
is true as well. Decisionmakers are constrained by the legitimacy
account created by the popular acceptability of their substantive
172. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
173. The discussion of Plessy should not be construed as approval of the rationale or
the result of that case. The decision, however, did insert the language of equality into the
national judicial process. While the Civil War amendments do include equality language,
they were hardly accepted by the Southern states, which felt extorted into ratifying the
amendments as a condition for reentering the Union. These very states embraced enthusias-
tically the language of equality in Plessy and, thus, began writing the epitaph of segregation.
174. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637
(1950) (separate but equal requires that once a black is admitted to a state-supported grad-
uate school, he must receive the same treatment by the state as students of other races);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate but equal requires actual equality of black
and white law schools or, alternatively, integration of white law schools); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (equal protection requires integration of
the only state-supported law school); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(separate but equal requires equal opportunities for higher education for both blacks and
whites within the state).
175. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. Jerome Frank explored the power of rhetoric in the development of a legal con-
cept from a fiction to an hypothesis, then to dogma, next to law, and finally to fact. J.
FRANK, FATE AND FREEoM: A PnmosopHY FOR FR= Atmucms 184-87 (1945). For a further
discussion of the role of craft skills such as rhetoric, see text accompanying notes 224-27
infra.
177. See text accompanying notes 150-54 supra.
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decisions. 17 8 Process gains acceptance, over time, by creating an
overall acceptable stream of primary rules. Consequently, in the
short-run, observance of secondary rules of recognition (process)
legitimates individual primary rules (substantive outcomes of the
process). If, however, the primary rules prescribed by any process
consistently or aggrievedly violate popular desires, the process it-
self will lose its legitimacy.
C. Limitations of Institutional Integrity
In addition to system legitimacy as a constraint on legal deci-
sionmakers, institutional integrity serves as a limitation on abuse
of discretion.179 The decisions emanating from any institution must
reflect the need to accommodate and be responsive to rival govern-
mental agencies and critics.180 No institution may encroach on the
domain of others or violate expectations of "appropriate behavior"
without endangering its own integrity181-its ability to influence
effectively the legal system as a whole.
The United States Supreme Court, for example, has fre-
quently been depicted as a nondemocratic institution in an alleg-
edly democratic political system.182 One response by the institution
to this portrayal is to develop concepts of lawyer's law-concepts
of standing, ripeness, political questions, and the like-as a
method of marking off its own appropriate territory of "cases and
controversies." While these doctrines appear as merely self-articu-
lated restrictions on institutional power, they are based on a sense
of the boundaries of judicial authority that may not be crossed too
often without causing other institutions to respond unsupportively,
178. According to Randy Barnett, Lon Fuller found the limitation of the positivists to
be their inability "to distinguish between the power of the State and the law and in their
failure to see that the [decisionmaker] is constrained by his own rules imposed from below
by the expectations of the citizenry." Barnett, Fuller, Law, And Anarchism, LmERTARIAN F.,
Feb. 1976, at 6.
179. The prior discussion of the bank account of legitimacy focused on acceptance of a
legal system as a whole. The consideration of institutional integrity concentrates on the
perceived "appropriateness" of behavior emanating from specific legal institutions.
180. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976) (federal courts must respect
the integrity of state court findings in fourth amendment contexts).
181. For example, Martin Shapiro described the institutional integrity concern of the
Supreme Court as the dilemma of "pursu[ing] its policy goals without violating those popu-
lar and professional expectations of 'neutrality' which are an important factor in our legal
tradition and principle source of the Supreme Court's prestige." M. SHAPIRO, supra note 50,
at 31.
182. See J. ELY, supra note 68, at 1-9; L. HAND, supra note 118, at 3-48. But see C.
BLACK, supra note 171, at 1-33; Rostow, supra note 116.
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producing an externally imposed limit on the Court's authority
and, thus, its ability to function.183
Lack of access to the executive sword and legislative purse has
often been cited as a limitation upon judicial abuse."" Early in the
Court's history such factors may very well have served as a severe
constraint upon its behavior.185 Given the present majesty of the
Supreme Court, however, few of those with access to purse or
sword would be wise to overtly disregard or reject Court rulings.
The threat of overt interposition is no longer credible.""'
Another apparent limitation upon the Court is Congress' con-
stitutional power to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to con-
sider specific issues. 87 Although throughout its history the Court
has been told that it had better stick to its knitting or risk destruc-
tion, somehow "[t]he possibility of judicial emasculation by way of
popular reaction against constitutional review by the courts has
not in fact materialized in more than [two centuries] of American
experience."18 This fact may be due either to the Court's now be-
ing too powerful (or rather, legitimate) to be so limited, or to the
Court tailoring its decisions precisely to avoid such a popular or
Congressional response. 8 The Court may function as does a cha-
183. In other words, although many jurists and critics dismiss the merits of judicial
craftsmanship, they would do well to consider the symbolic importance of "principled" judi-
cial decisionmaking for minimizing political conflict and enhancing the prospects for compli-
ance with their decisions.
184. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
185. Even Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), may have been little
more than a bluff by a weak judiciary attempting to assert its ability to mandate executive
behavior, specifically the bestowing of a judicial commission upon Marbury. Although the
Court strongly asserted its authority to review executive action, lack of jurisdiction pre-
vented the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The rhetoric of judicial authority had entered
American jurisprudence without giving the President an order to test through disobedience.
Thirty-five years passed before the Court actually compelled performance of any act by an
executive officer, see Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), and 170 years
passed before the President himself was so instructed, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974). In each case the language of Marbury was cited as precedent for the Court's
holding. The rhetoric of early years had been popularly accepted, thus giving the Court
authority to confront one of the world's most powerful individuals-the President of the
United States.
186. Consider President Nixon's compliance with the Court's decision in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), although his resignation would then be compelled. See also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
187. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2.
188. E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 165 (1962). In the one case in which
Congress did attempt to limit judicial behavior, during and after the Civil War, the Court
was able to emasculate the effort. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871);
Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 WalL) 85 (1868).
189. Carl Friedrich first described this latter possibility as the "rule of anticipated
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meleon and change its color to conform to its environment.
In spite of the skepticism expressed above toward some of the
traditionally discussed limits on judicial behavior, the law is at
times formed and limited by the concepts of judicial role and judi-
cial integrity. Consider the reapportionment cases beginning with
Baker v. Carr'90 in the early 1960s.
By the time Baker was decided by the Supreme Court, Ten-
nessee had not reapportioned its legislature in over sixty years.
During that time great changes in the distribution of the popula-
tion had occurred, producing extreme disparities in the number of
voters in different districts.1 91 Nevertheless, it was obvious that po-
litical intransigence made it unlikely that the Tennessee legislature
would call for apportionment reevaluation.192 Justice Clark be-
lieved that a Supreme Court refusal to act in a case of such
flagrant injustice and inequity would lead to a massive withdrawal
of institutional legitimacy."9 ' If the Court was to retain the na-
tional respect necessary to foster its own legitimacy, it needed to
act. As Professor Jan Deutsch has explained, "public acceptance of
the Court does not rest solely on perceptions of adequately general
decisions. That acceptance rests also, to a very considerable degree,
on a view of the Court as the guardian of our constitutional
rights."'" Baker presented a question of institutional credibility.
Yet judicial action was not without costs. For years the Court
had refused to involve itself in legislative reapportionment, per-
ceiving it as a nonjusticiable "political question." 95 In Baker, the
Court held for the first time that reapportionment was justiciable
and remanded the case for trial on the equal protection issue. In-
terestingly, Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, also spoke of
reactions." C. FR=ERICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PoLrIcs: NATURE AND DEVELOP.
MENT 16-18 (1937). See Deutsch, supra note 39, at 251-53.
190. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
191. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252, 254. For
example, Moore County with 2,340 voters elected one representative while Shelby County
with over 300,000 voters elected only seven. Id.
192. 369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring).
193. Justice Clark, concurring, expressed this concern: "It is well for this court to
practice self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication," he insisted,
but never in its history have those principles received sanction where the natural rights
of so many have been so clearly infringed for so long a time. National respect for the
courts is more enhanced through the forthright enforcement of those rights rather than
by rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuge.
Id. at 262.
194. Deutsch, supra note 39, at 216.
195. See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281
(1948); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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the need to protect national support of the institution. "The
Court's authority," argued Frankfurter, "ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must
be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in
appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from
injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements."'' 89
According to Frankfurter, such political entanglement was in-
evitable once the Court accepted jurisdiction in such cases. First,
he contended, talk of dilution of the vote required a standard of
proper vote worth as a reference. The Court, therefore, was being
asked to choose among competing bases of representa-
tion-ultimately among competing theories of political philoso-
phy.197 Second, even after the theoretical question was resolved, he
viewed reapportionment as involving such an extraordinary com-
plex of factors as to be seemingly beyond judicial competence. 198
Clark was arguing that public institutional acceptance re-
quired judicial action; Frankfurter claimed such action would de-
stroy public support. In Baker, Clark's view held the majority, but
Frankfurter's concerns had to be confronted. In 1964 the Supreme
Court decided the case of Reynolds v. Sims,"9 a challenge to the
alleged malapportionment of the Alabama legislature, in which the
Court adopted a "one man, one vote" standard for constitutional
apportionment. Many of the critics that had heralded the Court's
opinion in Baker blasted the Reynolds decision, which allowed for
only majority rule elections, as bad political theory. 00 "Madisonian
196. 369 U.S. at 267. Justice Frankfurter was afraid that lower courts would be embar-
rassed by such remands because, in his view, the Baker decision "convey[ed] no intimation
what relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislators to
play ducks and drakes with the judiciary." Id. at 268. To avoid such legislative evasion, the
courts would have to accept responsibility for what Professor Owen Fiss has termed "struc-
tural suits"-suits in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitu-
tional dimension, must undertake to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to
those values posed by the present institutional arrangement. Fiss, supra note 74, at 2. Such
suits would extend beyond the expectations of traditional judicial behavior.
197. 369 U.S. at 300.
198. The myriad factors cited by Frankfurter included:
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social
cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups, communications, the practical
effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions
and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior
status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.
Id. at 323.
199. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
200. Martin Shapiro, for example, a supporter of Baker, attacked the Court's decision
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democracy, '201 unlike majoritarian democracy, they argued, was to
be based on interest politics-the complex politics of group bar-
gaining that considered the measure of intensity surrounding an
issue,20 2 the lobbying ability of various groups, the effect of politi-
cal party loyalties, and the rights of minority groups. Justice Stew-
art, who had been in the majority in Baker, dissented in a compan-
ion case to Reynolds.20 "Appropriate legislative apportionment,"
he insisted, "should ideally be designed to ensure effective repre-
sentation in the State's legislature, in cooperation with other or-
gans of political power, of the various groups and interests making
up the electorate. '2 0' 4 Inequality of voting strength might contrib-
ute by balancing out other factors of electorate power-the power
of a well-financed and organized lobby, for example-to the overall
equality of all participants in the political process as a whole.20 5
The problem that the Court confronted in Reynolds was pre-
cisely that which Justice Frankfurter had presented in Baker. If
the Court were to accept Stewart's position, how could it deter-
mine whether a given voting plan led to greater or lesser equality
of representation in the legislative process? To consider adequately
the factors that Frankfurter felt were significant, 20 6 the Court
would have to examine intimately the distribution of political
in Reynolds. He contended that
[t]he Court's failure to grapple with the complex philosophical and theoretical issues
that lie behind the notion of constitutional democracy [had] led it away from the deli-
cate and tentative adjustments that our peculiar form of democracy requires and into
the formulation of appealing slogans. The "one man, one vote" slogan in equating the
whole of democracy with majority rule elections represents naive political philosophy,
bad political theory, and no political science.
M. SHAmo, supra note 50, at 250.
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
202. Populistic democracy counts heads without calculating the intensity of any given
position. Consider a situation in which a new irrigation system is being proposed. A majority
of taxpayers wishing to avoid even the minor increase in taxes necessary for the new system
may, if forced to take a stand one way or another, vote against such a proposal. For a minor-
ity, however, who happen to be farmers, the new system may mean the difference between
commercial life and death. If votes were discounted by intensity of position, the irrigation
system would be enacted.
203. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964).
204. Id. at 749.
205. This very argument is necessary to assure that the sixth amendment decision of
the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), does not constitute a violation of
the equal protection clause. While the indigent gets a service-an appointed, free attor-
ney-that the nonindigent defendant does not receive, this inequality is defended as a
method of equalizing the representation that both defendants will receive at trial. So, too, it
is argued, inequality in voting may create greater equality among individuals attempting to
influence legislation.
206. See note 198 supra.
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power within the state: the existence of voting blocs, the degree of
party control over various classes of voters and officials, the influ-
ence of mass media, and the financial resources behind various fac-
tions. 20 7 The record resulting from such an investigation would be
totally inconsistent with society's expectation of how the represen-
tative process should work. The symbolic role of the political sys-
tem would be seriously compromised, as would that of the judici-
ary that caused such a debacle.2 8
Consequently, in Reynolds the Court's institutional integrity
severely limited its ability to involve itself sensitively in voter ap-
portionment. As Justice Clark had insisted, 0 9 however, some cases
cried out for judicial attention. If the Court was to fulfill its role as
defender of the faith and address an obvious violation of an articu-
lated democratic value, while avoiding the political morass that
concerned Frankfurter, it had to choose a simple head-counting
procedure that required nothing beyond a cold statistical record.21 0
In conclusion, the need for institutional cooperation among
components of the legal process and the need for fulfillment of cul-
turally perceived institutional roles act as long-term limitations on
the options available to decisional elites. These limitations, how-
ever, shape decisional contours only over extended periods of time;
207. As Professor Jan Deutsch questioned,
Even assuming that the evidence was available and would be forthcoming, is it likely
that our society could accept, as a steady diet, the spectacle of the judiciary solemnly
ruling on the accuracy of a political boss's testimony concerning the sources of his
power over voters and the degree of control that he exercised over elected officials?
Deutsch, supra note 39, at 247.
208. Id. Consider in this light Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). The Court's "inexplicit mandate," he contended,
is at least subject to the interpretation that the court below is to inquire into such
matters as the "actual influence of Marion County's delegation in the Indiana legisla-
ture," and the possibility of "recurring poor performance by Marion County's delega-
tion with respect to [the ghetto].". . . If there are less appropriate subjects for federal
judicial inquiry, they do not come readily to mind.
Id. at 169-70.
209. See note 193 supra.
210. Even later cases allowing some flexibility in districting did so by setting an arbi-
trary percentage limit upon district size discrepancies. E.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315(1973) (reappointment variations of about ten percent do not violate the equal protection
clause). Arbitrary number determinations were more acceptable (less ideological) than any
subtle considerations of political power. For the role of random choice as a legal decision,
see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1230-35 (1970). Consider also the increased acceptance of the draft during the Viet-
nam War following the initiation of the draft lottery. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1968, § 18,
at 7. (Council of Graduate Schools urges Congress to abolish all deferments and to use ran-
dom lottery).
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they do not constrain sufficiently the day-to-day behavior of deci-
sional elites. It is to that problem that this Article must finally
turn.
D. Socialization, Hypocrisy, and Guilt
1. The Discrepancy Between Myth Systems and Operational
Codes
The earlier discussion of the content and role of myth in law
critiqued the belief that preexisting rules, rather than the ideology
of individual decisionmakers, act as the foundation for decisions. It
is, however, the public acceptance of this "myth system" that im-
parts legitimacy and authority to legal decision.2 1'
The decisional process actually employed by elites, the "opera-
tional code," was also introduced.2 1 An obvious discrepancy exists
between the myth system and the operational code. If the public
was informed of such a discrepancy, its belief in the legitimizing
myth might be destroyed. Consequently, knowledge of the opera-
tional code is restricted to the elite who function within it. 21 3 In
the context of the legal system, knowledge of the operational code
is generally restricted to lawyers.
Others, however, become aware of or intuitively sense the dis-
crepancy. Consequently, those who act by the code but legitimize
their behavior by reference to the myth often are perceived as in-
tellectually dishonest, corrupt, or manipulative. This perception of
the legal elite is not totally accurate because strict adherence to
the myth, as earlier demonstrated,214 is humanly impossible. Fur-
thermore, the discrepancy between myth and code is not an inten-
tional construction of elites, but rather an inevitable by-product of
social complexity. As the number and difficulty of the problems
presented to the legal decisionmaker increases, the discrepancy
likely will widen.2 15
The standards of behavior articulated in the myth systems are
211. H. CAIRNS, supra note 8, at 219; M. SHAPERO, supra note 50, at 31.
212. The concepts of "myth systems" and "operational codes" have been borrowed
from Professor W. Michael Reisman. See W. RmsImm, supra note 106, at 1.
213. Id. at 21. See Wasserstrom, supra note 23, at 18. One outcome of the discrepancy
between myth system and operational code, therefore, is the sharpening of distinctions be-
tween the elite and the rank and file and the increased identification between elites. W.
REiSMAN, supra note 106, at 29.
214. See text accompanying notes 33-74 supra.
215. The discrepancy widens in times of rapid social change, the very times when legal
decisionmakers are most in demand. W. RmsmAN, supra note 106, at 20.
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not attainable. They are, rather, components of a national morality
play '1 that presents ideal prescriptions for behavior. For example,
rhetoric critical of the political process frequently is expressed in
the language of the myth systems. The observation that a legisla-
tor's performance involved "nothing but party politics" is a re-
buke. Knowledgeable critics of the political process, however, know
that "party politics" are an integral part of the legislative process.
The language of the rebuke implicitly refers to the ideal of states-
manship that, in myth, always is to overshadow party affiliations.
The same observation can be made when a Justice insists that con-
stitutional rights are not affected by available resources, 17 or that
those in disagreement with him are "amending" rather than inter-
preting 18 the Constitution. Such a Justice is fully aware that avail-
216. This metaphor was dramatically developed by Bayless Manning in his discussion
of the American political system. Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of
Interest, American Government, and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239 (1964). Manning
wrote:
To the extent that our politics partake of the nature of a Morality Play, they have
inevitably required, and generated, a set of theatrical conventions as arbitrary, and as
acceptable, as those of any dramatic form. The vocabulary of our politics conforms to
its role as a national Morality drama. That vocabulary is formal, dogmatic, simplified,
symbolic, repetitive, and goal-setting.... And the actors in the political drama must,
as in epic drama, appear as more than life-size, establishing, declaring, and appearing
to live in accordance with, standards that are not of this world. We therefore demand
ultimate moral pronouncements from our parties and our officials. We beautify or apo-
theosize our former [leaders], feeling the need for unifying national moral norms and
having no national established church to do the job or to produce national saints.
Id. at 243.
217. In Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld an indi-
gent's right to receive a free trial record for appeal purposes even for crimes punishable only
by fine. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, insisted that
Griffin [v. Illinois] does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and
the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defen-
dants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own
way .... The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.
Id. at 196-97. In a society more and more conscious that resources are finite, decisionmakers
(judges and others) are more likely to recognize rights when resources are readily available
to effectuate them without bankrupting other societal goals and projects. Few judges have
been as candid as Judge Clement Haynesworth who, in Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), supported a right to appointed counsel for permissive
appellate review by arguing that "[w]hat is requisite today may not have been constitution-
ally requisite ten years ago, or even a few years ago. As our legal resources grow, there is a
correlative growth in our ability to implement basic notions of fairness." Id. at 655.
218. Even if a justice wished only to interpret the Constitution, the essence of such a
task is unclear. As Professor Lawrence Alexander asserts,
Not a single theorist has presented anything like a full-blown theory of what "interpre-
tation" really is and whether "interpretation" of a legal document is an ethically neu-
tral technique or is at least partially ethically freighted. We are still lacking even a
rudimentary theory of legal and particularly constitutional hermeneutics.
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able resources influence legal development and that any judicial
interpretation of a constitutional provision "amends" the Constitu-
tion. The Justice is merely referring to the myths of constitutional
continuity and stability in hopes of bolstering his own position
even though he is aware that the myth is unattainable.1 9
The inevitable discrepancy between myth system and opera-
tional code may explain why dissenting opinions in Supreme Court
decisions often surpass the opinion of the Court in logic and clar-
ity. The dissenter need not function within the operational code
since he need not accommodate his brethren to obtain a majority
or worry about the impact of his opinion were it to represent en-
forceable law. He can write for the purpose of ventilation or to in-
fluence posterity. The majority, on the other hand, must carefully
consider whether its decision will receive the public support neces-
sary to bestow legitimacy and avoid disruptive conflict. While the
discrepancy between myth and operation explains many observa-
ble phenomena of the legal system, the intrinsic value of the myth
remains subject to challenge. When the myth is unattainable and
makes the more realistic operational code seem improper, why
should myth not be synchronized with reality?
2. The Value of the Discrepancy
Decisionmakers are also members of the larger community
that embraces the myth of law. In childhood they were nurtured
by the myth; in adulthood, they are surrounded by its rituals. This
immersion within the myth frequently explains the beginning law
student's resistance to legal education22°--the training of a dis-
crepant operational code. It is this personal mooring within the
myth, explains Reisman, that "drives the individual who may be-
have according to an operational code discrepant from the myth
system nonetheless to defend with extraordinary passion the myth
system itself."'21
The gulf between myth and practice creates a tension for the
legal decisionmaker between a sense of how the legal system
should act and how it must act. The tension results in his having a
Alexander, supra note 43, at 3.
219. See Deutsch, supra note 39, at 237. Unlike Britain and its queen, our symbol of
continuity among past, present, and future is not a monarchical dynasty but a constitutional
document.
220. The myth may, in fact, have been what attracted the student to the law in the
first place. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
221. W. REiSMAN, supra note 106, at 25.
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sense of the system's hypocrisy and a feeling of guilt for participat-
ing in or perpetuating such hypocrisy.222 An internal friction is cre-
ated, and at its core is an uncomfortable sense of the breach of
trust.2
To reduce the outward appearance of participating in this
breach, craft skills are used. Decisionmakers must take pains to
explain or justify their decisions, to base them on something other
than institutional power and idiosyncratic belief.2 24 Such demands
of craft place limitations on the options-and abuses-of these de-
cisions.2 25 For example, resource limitations are generally unac-
ceptable as articulated grounds for constitutional determina-
tions. 26 Such limitations are too contextual and transitory to
justify decisions "interpreting" a document having an aura that
symbolizes consistency, continuity, and stability.
227
222. Owen Fiss describes the tension for the jurist involved in constitutional adjudica-
tion. As Fiss observes,
The judge might be seen as forever straddling two worlds, the world of the ideal and
the world of subjective preference, the world of the Constitution and the world of polit-
ics. He derives his legitimacy from only one, but necessarily finds himself in the other.
He among all the agencies of government is in the best position to discover the true
meaning of our constitutional values, but, at the same time, he is deeply constrained,
indeed sometimes even compromised, by his desire-his wholly admirable desire-to
give that meaning a reality.
Fiss, supra note 74, at 58. Even Fiss is entrenched in the myth, for the judge is to "discover
the true meaning of our constitutional values ...."
223. The decisionmaker may even crave candor and be revolted by what he is doing,
yet he may feel himself "trapped by 'the facts of life,' the unyielding realities from which
many are sheltered but which [his] elite position now permits, indeed forces [him] to con-
front." W. REISMAN, supra note 106, at 28.
224. Craft may be viewed as a two edged sword, both preventing abuse by limiting the
independence of decisionmakers and enhancing that independence by allowing them to
point to "reason" and "logic" as a justification for resisting popular pressures. See K. LLEW-
ELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 74 (1960).
225. The realists, observed Edward White, "failed to grant due respect to the fact that
a judge's use of these [craft] devices was itself constrained by the expectations of others."
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, in THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 627 (R. Aldisert ed. 1976). A judge who consistently failed
to give reasons for his decisions would not have met his obligation to allow the public to
evaluate the manner in which he was performing his office. But see Tushnet, Darkness on
the Edge of Town: The Contribution of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE
L.J. 1037, 1040 (1980).
226. See text accompanying notes 217-19 supra.
227. Even such highly revered symbols, at times, must be tainted. The Supreme
Court, for example, on a number of occasions has refused to apply retroactively a newly
articulated constitutional right of criminal defendants. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S.
406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Yet prospective-only application of
constitutional rulings overturning well-established precedent is not compatible with the
Blackstonian proposition that courts do not "pronounce a new law, but.., maintain and
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More than any concern for outward appearance, however, a
decisionmaker who has been well socialized into the myth before
entering the elite will find a need to reduce the internal tension of
inconsistency. Fulfillment of this need by the decisionmaker can
cause an uncanny striving to uphold the myth, to deviate from it
no further than is necessary to function effectively.228 Conse-
quently, a hypocritical legal system or society may only be one that
has set its ideals too high for attainment; the reach has exceeded
the grasp.2 9 To that extent, the hypocritical legal system may be a
highly desirable and ethical one.
The senses of guilt and responsibility as well as the need to fill
role expectations may be the most significant constraints on poten-
tial abuse or breach of trust by decisionmakers. The essence of the
morality play is the threat of the breach of trust; the undesirability
of that threat is itself the greatest limitation on its danger. Remove
the myth-make the operational code the desired as well as the
recognized reality-and the greatest protection against a dictato-
rial elite of lawyer decisionmakers will have been lost.230
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed and critiqued the myth of law as
rules and contrasted it with a view of law as a process of responsi-
expound the old one." W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 507 (1967). Since the constitutional
document itself has not changed, and if judicial authority flows from the Constitution, must
not the earlier, now overruled, interpretation of the Constitution have been "wrong"? The
myth system, apparently, is hard pressed to defend prospective-only overruling. Yet to give
cases such as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applying the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment to states, retroactive application could easily have caused wholesale re-
leases from state correctional institutions. The nonretroactivity decisions, thus, lose the ap-
pearance of constitutional imperatives (or of adequate generality) but avoid confronting so-
ciety with wholesale institutional displacement (causing a loss of institutional support and
credibility). The only alternative available that allowed retention of the constitutional im-
perative was for the Court to avoid creating (interpreting) new rights in the first place. Such
a cost likely would have been higher than that expended by the institutional exposure
caused by prospective-only rulings.
228. An example would be an attempt to limit the impact that resource limitations
have on legal right development, and a willingness to question the role of bias and prejudice
in one's own decisions.
229. See text accompanying note 12 supra. For a fuller discussion of the relationship
between hypocrisy and high moral ideals, see G. RADBRUCH, DER GEIST DES ENGLISCHEN
RECHTS 12-13 (3d ed. 1956).
230. Lawrence Tribe, in rejecting Ely's attempt to assimilate judicial review into dem-
ocratic theory, warns: "Might not the care and humility that we are entitled to expect of
judges be undermined if judges were indeed persuaded that much judicial activism is simply
a corollary of democracy?" Tribe, supra note 73, at 1080 (emphasis in original). For Tribe,
too, judges must live on the precipice.
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ble decisionmaking. The operational code of this process requires
that the lawyer recognize his role as decisionmaker and the neces-
sary ramifications of personal choice and responsibility inherent in
that role. Yet the individual who resists embracing the code, and
who seeks instead the holy grail, may only be clamoring for fulfill-
ment of the myth system. If his commitment to the significance of
the myth does not impede his education as decisionmaker or his
willingness to accept responsibility for the impact of the decisions
he makes, a continuing appreciation of the myth may create in him
a healthy unease. The unease may cause him to question the justi-
fication of an elite making decisions affecting others, as well as his
own qualifications to participate within such an elite. He also may
question the wisdom, justice, authority, and necessity of the spe-
cific decisional output of such an elite-"the law."
Consequently, while most lawyers will experience moments of
happiness due to their professional ability, those who become con-
tent with the state of "the law" may no longer be aware of the
impact of what they are doing. When the lawyer becomes content,
he has consciously rejected, or is inherently incapable of recogniz-
ing, the personal responsibility necessary to justify ethically the
operational code, and the essence of striving inherent in the myth
system-the morality play-has been lost upon him.
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